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The New-Breed, “Die-Hard” Chinese
Lawyer: A Comparison with American
Civil Rights Cause Lawyers
James Moliterno*
Lan Rongjie**
ABSTRACT
In times of social upheaval, lawyers can mark the way toward
social change. In particular, when lawyers become more aggressive
than traditional lawyers in the cause of fighting injustice, they face
backlash from multiple sources, including government and their
own profession. Such was the case during the U.S. civil rights
movement. Unusually aggressive behavior by cause lawyers was
met with hostility from their own profession and from government
action. Those lawyers, while battered at times with physical
violence, bar ethics charges, contempt of court, and state hostility,
survived and changed social conditions at the same time they
altered the culture of their own profession. Some have blamed them
for the so-called civility crisis in the legal profession. A phenomenon
with some, but not perfect parallels is happening in China. Activist
human rights and criminal defense lawyers have undertaken
tactics that are dramatically outside norms of behavior for Chinese
lawyers and arguably in violation of law. In general, they face even
harsher retribution than American civil rights lawyers did,
although the small number of American lawyers who faced violence
and near-death in racially-motivated violence could have faced no
harsher retaliation. The parallels, while far from completely
matching the two circumstances, are worth exploring and
considering as the world watches developments in the Chinese
justice system.
* Vincent Bradford Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University.
** Lan Rongjie, Southwestern University of Finance & Economics,
Chengdu China. Many thanks for excellent research assistance from Zherong
Kang, a Washington and Lee student.
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I. Introduction
A new breed of lawyer is practicing criminal defense in China.1
Dubbed the “die-hard lawyer” by the press, but sometimes
self-eschewing the label, these new lawyers say they are simply
representing their clients zealously, advancing their interests by
whatever legitimate means are at hand.2 What is being said of
1. See Alex Olesen, Meet China’s Swaggering, ‘Diehard’ Criminal Lawyers,
FOREIGN POLICY (May 16, 2014), https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/16/meetchinas-swaggering-diehard-criminal-lawyers/ (explaining that a new group of
lawyers has developed in China over the last few years) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
2. See id. (remarking on the new “diehard lawyers faction” in China and
what these lawyers believe).
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them in the press?3 What do they say about themselves?4 How do
they compare with the American civil rights era cause lawyer?5
Both groups of lawyers have been derided by the traditional
elements of their professions; members of both groups were
occasionally incarcerated by the government; both groups used
previously unused, aggressive methods to challenge the status
quo.6 The aggressive lawyering of the civil rights era cause lawyer
eventually became one of several accepted ways of lawyering in the
U.S.7 The long-term effects of developments in China remain to be
seen.8 But there is no question of the stir that has been created by
the die-hard lawyer.9 Like that of the American civil rights era
cause lawyer, it is a stir that is being felt at the highest levels of
government and established power structures.10
3. See id. (noting that these lawyers are being talked about in the press).
4. Interview by Professor James Moliterno with two of the more prominent
new breed of Chinese lawyers (July 2014).
5. See infra Section IV (comparing the Chinese die-hard lawyers with U.S.
civil rights cause lawyers).
6. See Teng Biao, Opinion, Chinese Human Rights Lawyers Under Assault,
WASH.
POST
(July
25,
2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/07/24/AR2009072402940.html
(describing
the
emergence of Chinese human rights lawyers, their motivations, and the
consequences they face for their insistence on the rule of law) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). See generally VOICES
OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYERS: REFLECTIONS FROM THE DEEP SOUTH, 1964–1980 (Kent
Spriggs ed., 2017) [hereinafter VOICES OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYERS] (recounting the
professional development of civil rights lawyers, the various causes they pursued,
the consequences they faced, as well as the historical context of civil rights
litigation, in the 1960s).
7. See generally ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, SECURING EQUAL
JUSTICE FOR ALL: A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED
STATES (rev. ed., 2007) (describing the efforts and impact of legal aid lawyers, a
“new breed of lawyers,” during the twentieth century).
8. See Olesen, supra note 1 (discussing the new phenomenon created by the
lawyers in China and the uncertain long-term effects).
9. See id. (referring to an article in a Communist Party journal that
complained that die-hard lawyers, “a ‘poisonous cancer’ on society,” were
“disrupting social order and undermining public safety”).
10. See id. (“The Chinese government is clearly worried about the so-called
diehards’ impact, and is moving to trim it . . . responding with an ‘increasingly
repressive policy’ that is trying to rein in the legal profession.”).
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Perhaps it seems exaggerated to compare the torture of
Chinese human rights lawyers to the hardships of U.S. civil rights
lawyers. This is a fair point, and to be sure, we do not suggest the
situations are precisely the same. We mean only to compare two
core aspects of the two sets of mistreatment that are strikingly
similar. Both groups of lawyers have “committed” the same core
offense: They are disrupting deeply-entrenched, well-guarded
social orders and power structures, and both groups of lawyers are
engaging in lawyering conduct that disturbs the norms of
traditional lawyer conduct. In these two ways, ways we suggest are
significant, the two groups of lawyers have parallel experiences
and potential impacts. In this article, we will both compare and
contrast the two sets of lawyers.
Although the torture, “disappearance,” and risk endured by
aggressive Chinese lawyers undoubtedly outstrips the day-to-day
life risks endured by U.S. civil rights lawyers, it bears
remembering the fervor and passion with which authorities,
especially but not exclusively in the South, endeavored to protect
the continued forms of slavery and white supremacy that
continued to thrive in the 1940s–1970s (and in some ways until the
present).11 Intent on maintaining a legal system of white
supremacy, authorities abandoned all sense of humanity when
dealing with the most audacious and the most successful civil
rights lawyers.12 While some such lawyers were run off, some were
physically beaten, and a few were bombing and lynching targets.13
The ferocity of treatment by authorities was sometimes cloaked in
the surface civility of a judge’s ruling against an out of state
lawyer’s pro hac vice motion, and was sometimes as raw as
attempted murder by local law enforcement and the local citizens
that the authorities tolerated and with whom they sometimes
conspired.14
11. Compare infra Part II (describing the harsh treatment of criminal
defense and human rights lawyers in China), with infra Part IV (describing the
treatment of U.S. civil rights lawyers).
12. See infra Part IV (describing the treatment of U.S. civil rights lawyers).
13. See infra Part IV (describing the unfortunate consequence of being a civil
rights lawyer).
14. See infra Part IV (discussing how the effort against civil rights lawyers
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When they were charged with a crime, the criminal charge of
choice against civil rights lawyers was practicing law without a
license or various forms of professional misconduct such as
barratry.15 These were lawyers, properly licensed in their home
states in the North, to be sure, but they were charged with
practicing without a Mississippi or Louisiana or Georgia law
license.16 Then, as now, it is common practice for a lawyer to be
temporarily out of his home state representing a client in a state
where he lacks a license.17 The common practice in litigation
settings is to associate with a local lawyer and ask the local court’s
permission to represent the lawyer’s client pro hac vice.18 Such
requests are routinely granted, although there is no due process
right to be heard on such a request and it can be denied without
any cause.19 These requests are a normal part of interstate
practice, and are rarely denied except when a local judge has some
active dispute with the lawyer or the client.20 For civil rights
was typically local).
15. See VOICES OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYERS, supra note 6, at 167–95 (detailing
the arrests of John C. Brittain, Armand Derfner, and Richard Sobol for practicing
without a license); see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963) (Douglas,
J., concurring) (“Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Tennessee
passed laws following our 1954 decision [in Brown v. Board of Education,] which
brought within their barratry statutes attorneys paid by an organization such as
the N.A.A.C.P and representing litigants without charge.”). Virginia later joined
the ranks of those states by enacting similar laws in 1956. NAACP, 371 U.S. at
445.
16. See VOICES OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYERS, supra note 6, at 167–95 (explaining
that these lawyers were in good standing in their home states).
17. See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 451 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“[A]ppearances by out-of-state counsel have been routine throughout the
country . . . .”).
18. See MODEL RULE ON PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)
(providing the current procedure for pro hac vice admission).
19. See Leis, 439 U.S. at 442 (finding that because the right of an out-of-state
lawyer to appear pro hac vice is not a “cognizable property interest” protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Constitution does not obligate state courts to
provide procedural due process to lawyers applying for pro hac vice admission).
20. See id. at 451 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The custom is so well recognized
that . . . there ‘is not the slightest reason to suppose that a qualified lawyer’s pro
hac vice request will be denied.’” (quoting Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364
F.2d 161, 168 (2d. Cir. 1966))).
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lawyers, that dispute was their disruption of social order and their
challenge to entrenched power structures.21 In China, human
rights lawyers are typically charged with disrupting public order,
picking quarrels and causing trouble, or inciting state
subversion.22 In reality, that is also what the U.S. civil rights
lawyer was being charged with, but there was (and is) no U.S. law
criminalizing such conduct. But unmistakably, the U.S. civil rights
lawyer was under attack in the South for disrupting social order
and causing trouble, and indeed, as in China, for threatening the
status quo power structure.
In the U.S., civil rights lawyers were subject to short jail
terms, some beatings, a rifle in the mouth, car bombings, house
bombings, and lynch mobs.23 In China, typically pursuant to the
RSDL (Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location)
statute,24 detained lawyers are subject to sleep deprivation, food
deprivation, mental anguish on relatives and friends, denial of
counsel, mental/emotional torture, and some physical beatings.25
Many such disappearances ended in forced confessions, broadcast
on television and reported in the state print media.26
21. See id. at 450 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In a series of cases brought in
courts throughout the South, out-of-state lawyers [appearing pro hac
vice] . . . developed the legal principles which gave rise to the civil rights
movement.”).
22. See Andrew Jacobs & Chris Buckley, China Targeting Rights Lawyers in
a Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07
/23/world/asia/china-crackdown-human-rights-lawyers.html
(discussing
the
accusations of “subversion and swindles” made by the Communist Party against
rights lawyers in China) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
23. See infra Part IV (describing violent threats and physical assaults civil
rights lawyers had to endure).
24. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa (中华人民共和国刑事诉
讼法) [Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated
by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 7, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980,
amended Mar. 14, 2012), art. 64, P.R.C. LAWS 72–77.
25. See SAFEGUARD DEFS., THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF THE DISAPPEARED:
STORIES FROM INSIDE CHINA’S SYSTEM FOR ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES 49–65
(Michael Caster, ed., 2017) [hereinafter SAFEGUARD DEFS., THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF THE DISAPPEARED] (describing the treatment under RSDL based on
the account of Liu Shihui).
26. See generally SAFEGUARD DEFS., SCRIPTED AND STAGED: BEHIND THE
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In both situations, massive state power was brought down on
lawyers.27 One enormous difference: In the U.S., ultimately but
often belatedly, federal authority was on side of civil rights
lawyer.28 Not so in China.
II. Who or What Is the “Die-Hard” Chinese Lawyer?
As groundwork for understanding the new breed of more
aggressive Chinese lawyer, one must first recognize that Chinese
Lawyers Law (the rough equivalent of laws on advocates in
European countries or the rules of professional conduct adopted by
each of the United States, usually by their state supreme courts)
places State interests above those of clients.29 To be sure, Western
lawyers must obey laws and balance their duties to clients with
their positions as “officers of the court.”30 But the understanding
in China that the State comes first is made explicit by the Chinese
Lawyers Law: “Practice by lawyers shall be subject to supervision
of the State, society and the parties concerned.”31 The foundational
SCENES OF CHINA’S FORCED TELEVISED CONFESSIONS (Rachel Tyrell ed., 2018)
[hereinafter SAFEGUARD DEFS., SCRIPTED AND STAGED] (analyzing forty-five forced
confessions between 2013 and 2018).
27. See infra Section II (comparing the respective government responses to
lawyer activism in contemporary China and in America during the civil rights
movement).
28. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963) (holding that the
activities of the NAACP, its affiliates and legal staff are modes of expression and
association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, which Virginia
may not prohibit under its power to regulate the legal profession as improper
solicitation of legal business).
29. See Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Lüshi Fa (中华人民共和国律师法)
[Lawyer Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 1, 2017, effective Jan. 1, 2018), P.R.C. Laws,
2018, art. 3. (“In legal practice, a lawyer shall subject himself to the supervision
of the State, society and the parties concerned.”).
30. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“A
lawyer’s responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal
system and a public citizen are usually harmonious.”).
31. See Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Lüshi Fa (中华人民共和国律师法)
[Lawyer Law of the People’s Republic of China], (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 1, 2017, effective Jan.1, 2018), P.R.C. Laws,

106

25 WASH. & LEE L. J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 99 (2018)

independence of lawyers in the United States is at least implicitly
prohibited and replaced by a foundation of State supervision.
III. Some History of Post-Revolutionary Chinese Lawyer
Regulation
1949–2012
In 1949, the newly established People’s Republic of China
abolished all of the laws under the old Republic of China
government, under the spirit of “contempt and criticize the
counterrevolutionary law and regulation of the KMT,32 contempt
and criticize Euro-American-Japanese capitalist anti-people law
and regulations.”33 Beginning in 1950, China experimented with a
new lawyer system, modeled after the Soviet system, which made
lawyers part of the government employee.34 Under the strong
ideology of class struggle, criminal defense lawyers were seen as
defending bad people, which was an abandonment of class
warfare.35 The initial lawyer system was discontinued during the

2018, art. 3.
32. Refers to Kuomintang, the Chinese Nationalist Party, which was
defeated in the revolution.
33. Zhang Zhiming (张志铭), Huimou he Zhanwang: Bainian Zhongguo
Lüshi de Fazhan Guiji (回眸和展望: 百年中国律师的发展轨迹) [Looking Back and
Forward: Lawyer’s Development in China in the Past Century], Guojia
Jianchaguan Xueyuan Xuebao (国家检察官学院学报) [Journal of National
Prosecutors College] (2013 vol. 1); see Zhongyang Guanyu Feichu Guomindang
Liufaquanshu he Queding Jiefangqu Sifa Yuanze de Zhishi (中央关于废除国民党
《六法全书》和确定解放区司法原则的指示) [The Party Central’s Guidance
Regarding the Abolishment of KMT’s Six Codes and the Establishment of Judicial
Principles
of
the
Liberated
Area],
(Feb.
22,
1949)
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66650/4491574.html# (deriding the
laws and policies of the KMT and calling for their abolition) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
34. Zhang, supra note 33 (describing the historic development of lawyer
system in China).
35. See id. (describing the public opinion towards lawyers in China in the
1950s).
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“anti-rights movement” in 1957, when many lawyers were
criticized as rightists, and some were sent to labor camps.36
During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the legal system
as a whole was abolished when the “authoritarianism of the mass”
replaced the police-prosecutor-court system.37 During this period,
philosophically, there was no need for courts, judges, prosecutors,
and defense lawyers.38 The public was encouraged to take matters
of loyalty to the Party into their own hands and enforce these
norms.39 The results included rampant mob confiscation and
destruction of property belonging to “landlords,” and the meting
out of punishment for perceived offenses against the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP or Party) in the name of the revolution.
The Red Guards ruled. Formal justice administration by courts
and their officers was superfluous.
The lawyer system was reinstated in 1978 when China ended
the Cultural Revolution and was on its way toward the Reform and
Opening Up.40 In April 1979, the National People’s Congress (NPC)
set up a special team for drafting regulations on lawyers, and in
July, the Criminal Procedural Law was passed and the lawyer’s
participation in the legal system was officially established through
this law.41 In August 1980, the NPC Standing Committee passed
the Temporary Regulation on Lawyers.42
The reinstated lawyer system was similar to the one
established in the 1950s in which lawyers were “legal professionals
36. See id. (describing the impact of anti-rights movement on lawyers and
the end of the lawyer system in China).
37. See id. (describing the abandonment of the law during the Cultural
Revolution).
38. See id. (explaining the incompatibility of the western lawyer system to
the revolutionary China).
39. See id. (explaining that political ideology was more important than the
law during the Cultural Revolution).
40. See id. (describing the reinstatement of the lawyer system in China).
41. See id. (explaining the legislative effort to reinstate the lawyer system in
China).
42. Xiong Qiuhong (熊秋红), Xin Zhongguo Lüshi Zhidu de Fazhan Licheng
ji Zhanwang (新中国律师制度的发展历程及展望) [Lawyer Development History
and Expectations of the New China], Zhongguo Faxue (中国法学) [China Legal
Science] 15 (1999 Vol. 5).
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of the state.”43 All lawyers worked for the “legal consultancy
bureau (法律顾问处),” (later called Lawyer Affair’s Bureau (律师事
务所), which is the same word used by private law firms today)
which was a government-organized nonprofit organization.44
Starting in 1988, the State Council (essentially the central
government body) started to experiment with partnership models
for law firms where the partners no longer worked for the
government and the law firms were no longer in the government
budget.45 This activity was one small part of this period’s general
phenomenon in China of slightly opening the economic system
while maintaining tight control over political processes.46 In this
period, the Soviet Union first opened the political process,
resulting in massive instability, collapse of the Union, its economy,
and its control over its satellite states in Eastern and Central
Europe. China followed largely an opposite path from that of the
Soviet Union.
These new experiments with private lawyering and
partnerships were legalized in 1993 when State Council passed the
Ministry of Justice Plan for Deepening Lawyer Reform (司法部关
于深化律师工作改革的方案).47 NPC Standing Committee passed
the PRC Lawyer’s Law (中华人民共和国律师法) in May 1996,48
which defined lawyers as “professionals that provide legal services
to the society, who have obtained professional license according to
law” (依法取得执业证书，为社会提供法律服务的执业人员) instead
of the “legal professional of the state” (国家法律工作者) in the old
system.49 Lawyers became private practitioners instead of
government employees.50

43. See Zhang, supra note 33 (comparing the lawyer system in the 1980s
with 1950s).
44. See id. (describing the public service nature of the lawyer in the 1980s).
45. See Xiong, supra at 42 (describing the privatization of lawyers in China).
46. See id. (describing the privatization of the legal profession as part of the
market economy reform).
47. See id. (describing the privatization of lawyers in China).
48. See id. at 15 (describing the privatization of lawyers in China).
49. See id. (describing the privatization of lawyers in China).
50. See id. at 16 (describing the privatization of lawyers in China).
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China’s Legal Reform 2012–2015
Since Xi Jinping took power as the General Secretary of the
Chinese Communist Party in 2012, China has undergone
significant legal reform.51 Revisions in criminal and administrative
procedural laws seemed to allow lawyers to play a larger role in
the legal process.52 A range of wrongful criminal convictions were
overturned, many after decades, and received huge media
attention as the success of the legal reform.53 Human rights
lawyers and activists were at first encouraged by these reforms
and many believed they signaled an opening up to a heightened
role for lawyers in the justice system.54
Ironically, given later events, the apparent reforms during the
early period of President Xi’s term may have emboldened human
rights lawyers in a way that alarmed the Party.55 This alarm may
have contributed to the 709 Crackdown.56

51. See China Focus: China Scores New Achievements in Judicial Protection
of
Human
Rights,
XINHUA
(July
15,
2017,
9:52:28
PM),
http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-07/15/c_136446475.htm
(identifying
different areas of legal reform since 2012) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
52. See id. (detailing new or revised laws that protect lawyers’ right of
practice and rules criminal defense lawyers may use to exclude illegally obtained
evidence).
53. See id. (indicating that certain judicial reform initiatives aimed at
quelling the miscarriage of justice led to the overturning of wrongful convictions);
see also infra Part II.A.2.c (describing some of the wrongful convictions that were
overturned).
54. See XINHUA, supra note 51 (explaining how human rights lawyers were
encouraged by the reforms).
55. See id. (explaining how the reforms possibly emboldened human rights
lawyers).
56. July 9, 2015 marked a months-long sweep of more than 300 human
rights lawyers, legal assistants, and activists. China: On “709” Anniversary, Legal
Crackdown Continues, HUM. RTS. WATCH (JULY 7, 2017 1:54 AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/07/china-709-anniversary-legal-crackdowncontinues (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
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Amendments in Legislation
1. Criminal Procedure Law

The Criminal Procedure Law went through extensive revision
in 2012, aiming to increase the role of trials, judges and lawyers,
and thus rid the courts’ reputation as rubber stamps for the state.57
The revision added five articles (articles 54–58) that purport to
preclude the use of evidence obtained through torture.58
The new Criminal Procedure Law also encouraged the taking
of witness testimony in the courtroom for the first time.59 In the
past, witness testimonies were only presented to the court on paper
and judges made decisions purely from the paperwork.60
Cross-examination of witnesses was rare.61 The newly revised
Article 59 requires that witness testimony must be examined by
both sides to be admitted.62 Newly added Articles 62 and 63
contemplated the protection and compensation for witnesses who
appear in court.63 Newly added Articles 187 and 188 regulated
what kind of witnesses must testify (in court) and compulsory
attendance measures for witnesses who do not appear in court

57. Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Guanyu Xiugai Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Xingshi Susongfa de Jueding(全国人民代表大会关于修改《中华人民共
和国刑事诉讼法》的决定) [Decision of the National People’s Congress on the
Amendment of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 2012, effective Jan. 1,
2013), § 18.
58. See id. (describing the various revisions of articles of the Criminal
Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China).
59. Id. §§ 19–20 and §§ 71–72.
60. See generally Zhuohao Wang, Why Chinese Witnesses Do Not Testify at
Trial in Criminal Proceedings, CHINA MINISTRY OF EDUC.—PROJECT OF HUMAN.
AND SOC. SCI. (No. 13YJC820073) (2011) (explaining how testimony was originally
presented).
61. See Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Guanyu Xiugai Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Xingshi Susongfa de Jueding, supra note 57 (describing the various
revisions of articles of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of
China).
62. Id. § 19, art. 59.
63. Id. § 20.
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without adequate excuse.64 Revised Article 192 allowed expert
witnesses to testify in trials for the first time.65 Starting from early
2017, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) initiated a national
campaign to “substantialize criminal trials,” requiring
participation of defense lawyers and live witnesses in more
criminal trials.66 Together these revised articles and following
reforms described a possible conversion from largely paper trials
to trials dominated by live testimony.67 In practical application,
despite the vast revisions and some increase in the use of live
testimony, trials today are still largely based on paper.68
On paper, the revisions expanded the scope of the defense
lawyers’ participation throughout the criminal process.69 Article 36
was changed so that lawyers may “participate” in the investigation
stage, rather than “assist,” as the old law allowed.70 Lawyers were
also allowed to participate in the review of death penalty cases
with the Supreme Court.71 An ambitious reform proposal recently
64. Id. § 71.
65. Id. § 72.
66. Sup. People’s Ct., Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Quanmian Tuijin yi
Shenpan wei Zhongxin de Xingshi Susong Zhidu Gaige de Shishi Yijian (最高人民
法院关于全面推进以审判为中心的刑事诉讼制度改革的实施意见)
[Enforcement
Opinion of the Supreme People’s Court on Carrying out Criminal Procedure
Reforms Centered on Trials] (Feb. 17, 2017).
67. See supra notes 57–66 and accompanying text (noting how trial practice
has changed).
68. See generally Zhuohao Wang, supra note 60.
69. See Sup. People’s Ct., Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Quanmian Tuijin
yi Shenpan wei Zhongxin de Xingshi Susong Zhidu Gaige de Shishi Yijian, supra
note 66 (explaining the work defense lawyers would participate in).
70. Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Guanyu Xiugai Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Xingshi Susongfa de Jueding (全国人民代表大会关于修改《中华人民共
和国刑事诉讼法》的决定) [Decision of the Nat’l People’s Cong. on the Amend. of
the Crim. Proc. L. of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
President of the People’s Republic of China, Mar. 14, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013),
at § 8, https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/second-amendment-tothe-criminal-procedure-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of
(on
file
with
the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
71. See China’s New Criminal Procedure Law: Death Penalty Procedures,
HUM. RTS. J. (Apr. 3, 2012), https://www.duihuahrjournal.org/2012/04/chinasnew-criminal-procedure-law-death_03.html (referring to the amendment to
Article 240, which requires the Supreme People’s Court to listen to the opinion of
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promulgated aims to provide professional assistance to every
criminal defendant,72 although currently less than 30% of
defendants have a lawyer.73
2. Administrative Procedure Law
The 2014 Administrative Procedure Law revision changed the
case acceptance system of courts from “review system for case
docket” (立案审查制) to “registration system of case docket” (立案登
记制).74 The revision means that when plaintiffs file cases in a
court, the court will no longer decide whether to accept the case
depending on the merits of the case, but the court will accept and
register all the cases, or will provide a written explanation of why
the case is not accepted within seven days of filing.75 This change
defense attorney upon his or her request during the death penalty review process)
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
72. See Guanyu Kaizhan Xingshi Anjian Lüshi Bianhu Quanfugai Shidian
Gongzuo de Banfa (最高人民法院 司法部 关于开展刑事案件律师辩护全覆盖试点工
作的办法) [Sup. People’s Ct. & Ministry of Just. Pilot Plan of Universal Coverage
of
Law.
Def.
in
Crim.
Cases]
(effective
Oct.
11,
2017),
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-62912.html (detailing defense counsel
representation reform plans) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
73. CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, DEFENSE LAWYERS TURNED DEFENDANTS:
ZHANG JIANZHONG AND THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF DEFENSE LAWYERS IN CHINA
11 (2003) (citing Wang Jin, Are Defense Lawyers Able to Enjoy ‘Special Rights,’
BEIJING YOUTH DAILY, May 22, 2001).
74. Susan Finder, New Docketing Procedures Come to the Chinese Courts,
SUP.
PEOPLE’S
CT.
MONITOR
(June
18,
2015),
https://supremepeoplescourtmonitor.com/2015/06/18/new-docketing-procedurescome-to-the-chinese-courts/ (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
75. Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Xiugai
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jueding (全国人民代表大
会常务委员会关于修改《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的决定) [Decision of the Nat’l
People’s Cong. Standing Comm. on the Amend. of the Admin. Proc. L. of the
People’s Rep. of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong.,
Nov.
1,
2014,
effective
May
1,
2015),
at
§ 31,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2014-11/02/content_1884662.htm (on file with
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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made it easier for people to file administrative lawsuits. In the
past, courts were reluctant to review administrative lawsuits
against the government that they considered too “sensitive.”76
The 2014 Administrative Procedure Law revision also added a
clause prohibiting administrative agencies from interfering with
the courts’ filing of administrative cases and requiring agencies to
appear in court for lawsuit hearings.77
In February 2018, the Supreme People’s Court released an
interpretation document for the Administrative Procedure Law.78
It removed ten kinds of actions from the jurisdiction of
administrative courts.79 Among them are claims based on actions
of public security and state security agencies authorized under the
Criminal Procedure Law, which include detention under RSDL.80

76. See For Some Plaintiffs, Courts in China are Getting Better, ECONOMIST
(Sep. 30, 2017) https://www.economist.com/china/2017/09/30/for-some-plaintiffscourts-in-china-are-getting-better (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Social Justice).
77. See Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu
Xiugai Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jueding (全国人民
代表大会常务委员会关于修改《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的决定) [Decision of
the Nat’l People’s Cong. Standing Comm. on the Amend. of the Admin. Procedure
L. of the People’s Rep. of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015), at § 3,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2014-11/02/content_1884662.htm (detailing
the revised procedural requirements) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal
of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
78. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法
》的解释) [Interpretation of the Sup. People’s Ct. Concerning the Application of
the Admin. Proc. L. of the People’s Rep. of China] (promulgated by the Jud.
Comm. of the Sup. People’s Ct., Nov. 13, 2017, effective Feb. 8, 2018),
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-80342.html
(on
file
with
the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
79. See id. art. 1.
80. See id.
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Political Commitments
1. Judicial Independence

Besides the legislative changes, statements, and regulations
from the CCP, in other ways the government suggested the
leadership was committed to increasing the role of lawyers and
bringing more independence to the courts.
Starting in 2015, the SPC started to set up circuit courts that
are separated from local governments and directly report to the
SPC in Beijing.81 Within two years, the SPC set up six circuit
courts around the country.82 The President of the Second Circuit
Court, Hu Yunteng, wrote at the time in Qiu Shi, one of the most
influential political commentary magazines published by the CCP,
that setting up the circuit courts was aimed to ensure the
independence of the judiciary from the influence of local
authorities.83
In March 2015, the CCP and State Council jointly issued a
regulation on the prevention of and penalties for local government
officials intervening in judiciary activities.84 In November of the
81. See Margaret Y.K. Woo, Court Reform with Chinese Characteristics, 27
WASH. INT’L L. J. 242, 263–64 (2017) (discussing the establishment of circuit
courts as branches of the Supreme People’s Court to hear inter-regional cases).
82. Id. at 265.
83. See Hu Yunteng (胡云腾), Wei Shenme Yao Sheli Xunhui Fating? (为什
么要设立巡回法庭？) [Why Do We Need to Set Up Circuit Courts?], Qiu Shi [求是
] (June 15, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/201506/15/c_1115588377.htm (explaining that the circuit courts were established to
separate the judicial system from administrative divisions and to guarantee an
independent, fair, and impartial judiciary) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also Carl Minzner, Legal Reform in
the Xi Jingping Era, 20 ASIA POL. 4, 7 (2015) (“The creation of cross-jurisdictional
local courts and procuratorates seeks to cut across existing administrative lines
of authority and curb the influence of local officials.”).
84. Guanyu Lingdao Ganbu Ganyu Sifa Huodong Chashou Juti Anjian Chuli
de Jilu, Tongbao he Zeren Zhuijiu Guiding (关于领导干部干预司法活动插手具体案
件处理的记录、通报和责任追究规定) [Regulation on the Recording, Reporting and
Accountability Measures for Intervention of Judicial Activities and Meddling of
Specific Cases by Officials] (promulgated by the General Office of the Communist
Party of China and General Office of the State Council, effective Mar. 18, 2015)
http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2015-03/30/content_2840521.htm (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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same year, and again in February 2016, the CCP’s Central Political
and Legal Affairs Commission published a combination of twelve
typical examples of prohibited intervention by government officials
in judicial activities.85 These cases include local government
officials, judges, prosecutors, and police officers trying to influence
cases by exercising their public authority.86
The term “judicial independence” in China only means
independence from the personal interests of officials or the undue
influence of local governments.87 It does not mean independence
from the CCP leadership.88 The ideological control by the CCP is a
foundational aspect of the justice system; at least in matters of
interest to the CCP, there is no judicial independence from the
interests of the CCP.89 In fact, the CCP ideological control has been
85. See Zhongyang Zhengfawei Tongbao 5 qi Ganyu Sifa, Chashou Anjian
Chuli Dianxing Anjian (中央政法委通报5起干预司法、插手案件处理典型案件)
[Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission Reports 5 Typical Cases of
Intervention of Judicial Activities and Meddling of Cases], RENMIN WANG (人民网
)
[PEOPLE’S
NETWORK]
(Nov.
6,
2015
11:17
AM),
http://fanfu.people.com.cn/n/2015/1106/c64371-27785727.html [hereinafter 2015
Cases of Intervention] (providing examples of five government officials
intervening in judicial activities and specific cases) (on file with the Washington
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also Zhongyang Zhengfawei
Tongbao qi qi Ganyu Sifa Dianxing Anjian (中央政法委通报七起干预司法典型案件
[Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission Reports Seven Typical Cases of
Intervention of Judicial Activities] RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY]
(Feb. 2, 2016, 7:30 AM), http://fanfu.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0202/c6437128102905.html [hereinafter 2016 Cases of Intervention] (providing seven
examples of government officials intervening in judicial activities and specific
cases) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
86. See Cases of Intervention, supra note 85.
87. See Judicial Independence in the PRC, CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA,
https://www.cecc.gov/judicial-independence-in-the-prc (last visited Oct. 16, 2018)
(describing the more limited concept of judicial independence that exists in China
as compared with that in the West) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal
of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
88. See id. (explaining that the leadership of the Party, the people’s
congresses, and the procuratorate “are generally not considered improper
restraints on judicial independence”).
89. See id. (noting that “judges are expected to adhere to the leadership of
the Party” and that while “Party interference is less common than local
government official interference . . . this distinction is clouded in practice, as most
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growing even stronger, even among legal professionals. At a
conference with provincial high court presidents in 2017, the SPC’s
president, Zhou Qiang, explicitly addressed the importance of
ideological work and categorized the western ideas of
“constitutional democracy,” “checks and balances,” and “judicial
independence” as “wrongful thought.”90 Although it caused a huge
backlash from the public, the SPC did not back down from Zhou
Qiang’s statement.91 Instead, the SPC published two
commentaries three days later supporting the statement, further
explaining why the western legal system is not suitable for China
and why promoting western ideology is dangerous to the country.92
Despite technical improvements in independence from local
key government officials are also Party members”).
90. Supreme People’s Court (最高人民法院), Zhou Qiang: Zhashi Zuohao
Renmin Fayuan Gexiang Gongzuo, Yi Youyi Chengji Yingjie Dang de Shijiuda
Shengli Zhaokai (周强：扎实做好人民法院各项工作，以优异成绩迎接党的十九大胜
利召开) [Zhou Qiang: Solidly Accomplish all the Tasks of the People’s Courts,
Welcome the Victorious Opening of the Nineteenth Party Congress with Excellent
Achievements],
SINA
WEIBO
(Jan.
14,
2017,
7:14
PM),
https://weibo.com/3908755088/EqOiSharJ?type=comment#_rnd1519865052159
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
91. See Michael Forsythe, China’s Chief Justice Rejects an Independent
Judiciary,
and Reformers
Wince,
N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 19,
2017)
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/world/asia/china-chief-justice-courts-zhouqiang.html?_ga=2.186358443.369514703.1519864599-175205695.1517193387
(addressing the frustrations felt in China and abroad with Zhou Qiang’s rejection
of the Western concept of judicial independence) (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
92. See Supreme People’s Court (最高人民法院), Guchui Cuowu Sichao Weiji
Guojia Zhengzhi Anquan (鼓吹错误思潮危及国家政治安全) [Promoting Wrongful
Thoughts are Dangerous for the Political Security of the Country], SINA WEIBO
(Jan.
17,
2017,
11:38
PM)
https://weibo.com/3908755088/ErijuBj4q?type=comment#_rnd1519866340176
(providing support for Shou Qiang’s statement) (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also Supreme People’s Court (最
高人民法院), Dui Cuowu Sichao Liangjian Shi Women de Lishi Shiming (对错误
思潮亮剑是我们的历史使命) [Challenging Wrongful Thoughts is Our Historical
Mission],
SINA
WEIBO
(Jan.
17,
2017,
11:39
PM),
https://weibo.com/3908755088/ErijQecNt?type=comment#_rnd1519866312942
(same) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).

THE NEW BREED, “DIE-HARD” CHINESE LAWYER

117

authorities, ideological control is not going away in the Chinese
court system but, instead, is growing even stronger.93
2. Protecting Lawyers’ Professional Rights
Even after the 709 Crackdown, in September 2015, the
Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate,
Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, and
Ministry of Justice jointly issued the Regulations on Protecting
Lawyers’ Professional Rights According to Law.94 Similar to the
added professional rights for lawyers in the Criminal Procedure
Law amendment,95 this Regulation is a reiteration of the lawyer’s
rights and an implementation guide for the agencies.96 Although
the Regulation shows the commitment to protect the lawyers’
rights, violations are still common.97
93. See Forsythe, supra note 91, (describing President Xi Jingping’s demand
for obedience from the judiciary).
94. See Guanyu Yifa Baozhang Lüshi Zhiye Quanli de Guiding (关于依法保
障律师执业权利的规定) [Regulations on Protecting Lawyers’ Professional Rights
According to Law] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., the People’s
Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of St. Security, and Ministry
of Just., effective Sept. 16, 2015) http://www.xinhuanet.com/legal/201509/20/c_1116616593.htm (outlining the rights of Chinese lawyers) (on file with
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
95. Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Guanyu Xiugai Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Xingshi Susongfa de Jueding (全国人民代表大会关于修改《中华人民共
和国刑事诉讼法》的决定) [Decision of the National People’s Congress on the
Amendment of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/huiyi/lfzt/xsssfxg/2012-03/15/content_1717671.htm (on file
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
96. Guanyu Yifa Baozhang Lüshi Zhiye Quanli de Guiding (关于依法保障律
师执业权利的规定) [Regulations on Protecting Lawyers’ Professional Rights
According to Law] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., the Sup. People’s
Procuratorate, Ministry of Pub. Security, Ministry of St. Security, and Ministry
of Just., effective Sept. 16, 2015) http://www.xinhuanet.com/legal/201509/20/c_1116616593.htm (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
97. See China: Release Human Rights Lawyers, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 15,
2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/15/china-release-human-

118

25 WASH. & LEE L. J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 99 (2018)

Several of the lawyers defending the “709 lawyers,” for
example, were shown a boilerplate Decision to Reject the Lawyer’s
Request to Meet with the Criminal Suspect.98 Article 9 of the
Regulation says that if law enforcement determines that, in cases
involving state security, terrorist activity, or significant bribery,
allowing a lawyer to meet with the suspect might impair the
investigation or leak state secrets, law enforcement may deny the
meeting and provide an explanation to the lawyer.99 These
rights-lawyers (detailing the many ways the Chinese government has wrongfully
punished Chinese lawyers) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
98. See Liu Sixin, Zhao Wei Shexian Shandian Buyu Lüshi Huijian ji
Biangeng Qiangzhi Cuoshi (刘四新、赵威涉嫌煽颠不予律师会见及变更强制措施)
[Liu Sixin and Zhao Wei Suspected for Inciting Subversion, Not Allowed to Meet
Lawyer or Change Custodian Measures], CHINA FREE PRESS (Sept. 22, 2015),
http://www.canyu.org/n103083c12.aspx [hereinafter Liu Sixin and Zhao Wei
Suspected] (showing letters from the Tianjin Public Security rejecting for state
security reasons the request of lawyers for Zhao Wei and Liu Sixin to meet with
their clients) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice); see also Wang Yu Lüshi She Shandong Dianfu Guojia Zhengquan Zaici
Buzhun Lüshi Huijian (王宇律师涉煽动颠覆国家政权再次不准律师会见) [Lawyer
Wang Yu Suspected for Inciting Subversion of State Regime, Not Allowed to Meet
Lawyer
Again],
BOXUN
(博讯)
(Sept.
30,
2015),
http://boxun.com/news/gb/china/2015/09/201509302135.shtml#.Vre_BDYrLNA
[hereinafter Wang Yu Suspected] (showing a letter from Tianjin Public Security
rejecting for state security reasons the request of Wang Yu’s lawyers to meet with
their client) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice); Zhang Kai Buzhun Jian Lüshi, Wenzhou Jingfang Fa Shumian Tongzhi
(张凯不准见律师 温州警方发书面通知) [Zhang Kai Not Allowed to Meet Lawyer,
Wenzhou Police Issued Written Notice], RADIO FREE ASIA (自由亚洲电台) (Sept. 8,
2015),
https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/renquanfazhi/ql109082015123133.html [hereinafter Zhang Kai Not Allowed to Meet Lawyer]
(showing letter from Wenzhou Public Security rejecting for state security reasons
the request of Zhang Kai’s lawyer to meet with his client) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
99. Guanyu Yifa Baozhang Lüshi Zhiye Quanli de Guiding (关于依法保障律
师执业权利的规定) [Regulations on Protecting Lawyers’ Professional Rights
According to Law], (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme
People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security,
and Ministry of Justice, Sept. 16, 2015, effective Sept. 16, 2015),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/legal/2015-09/20/c_1116616593.htm (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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boilerplate rejection forms do not provide any explanation but
simply say that the case is related to state security.100 They plainly
violate the requirement of the Regulation101 Professor Jerome
Cohen observed that one of the rejection notices is numbered 1082,
which he interprets to mean that the notice is the 1,082nd rejection
of the year issued by the Public Security Bureau.102 Even if
Professor Cohen’s interpretation is incorrect and it was not the
1,082nd rejection, rejecting a lawyer’s attempt to meet with a client
is prevalent, and not just in state security cases.103
3. Overturning of Wrongful Convictions
To showcase the country’s determination and success in legal
reform, Chinese media highly publicized the overturning of several
wrongful convictions.
In the case of Nian Bin, for example, Nian Bin was sentenced
to death for poisoning his neighbors.104 SPC rejected the death
penalty because of insufficient evidence.105 Nian Bin was sentenced
to death again, and the death penalty was rejected three more

100. Liu Sixin and Zhao Wei Suspected, supra note 98; Wang Yu Suspected,
supra note 98; Zhang Kai Not Allowed to Meet Lawyer, supra note 98.
101. See Guanyu Yifa Baozhang Lüshi Zhiye Quanli de Guiding (关于依法保
障律师执业权利的规定) [Regulations on Protecting Lawyers’ Professional Rights
According to Law] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., the Sup. People’s
Procuratorate, Ministry of Pub. Security, Ministry of St. Security, and Ministry
of
Justice,
Sept.
16,
2015,
effective
Sept.
16,
2015)
http://www.xinhuanet.com/legal/2015-09/20/c_1116616593.htm (explaining the
rights lawyers have to engage with criminal suspects) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
102. Posting
of
Jerome
Cohen,
jacohen@paulweiss.com,
to
CHINALAW@hermes.gwu.edu (Feb. 7, 2016) (on file with author).
103. See id.
104. Zhang Debi (张德笔), Nianbin Xiyuan Lu: Sici Pansi, Zhongyu Wuzui (念
斌洗冤录：四次判死，终于无罪) [Story of Nian Bin’s Regaining of Innocence: Four
Times Sentenced to Death, Eventually Acquitted], TENCENT REV. (腾讯评论) (Aug.
23, 2014), http://view.news.qq.com/original/intouchtoday/n2894.html (on file with
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
105. Id.
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times.106 The expert witness in this last trial finally found the
evidence that fully exonerated Nian Bin.107 Police evidence showed
poison in the water, but the expert witness’s tests found no poison
on the teapot.108 Nian Bin was acquitted after eight years on death
row.109 Nian Bin’s lawyer, Zhang Yansheng, said that the
introduction of the expert witness was crucial in proving Nian
Bin’s innocence.110
In another case, Chen Man was arrested in 1992 for murder
and was sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve in 1994.111 He
missed the appeal deadline, but the Procuratorate thought the
sentence was too light and appealed for a death sentence without
reprieve.112 The Hainan provincial high court upheld the
suspended death sentence in 1999.113 Chen Man’s family and
lawyers continued to appeal and petition to the Hainan high court
and Supreme People’s Procuratorate.114 In 2014, a number of high
profile lawyers (some of them may be categorized as die-hard
lawyers) had a meeting to discuss Chen Man’s case and a journalist
in attendance later published the story.115 In 2015, the Supreme
106. Id.
107. Li Yunfang (李云芳), Duihua Nianbin Lüshi Zhangyansheng: Yao
Biaoyang Faguan, Guli Tamen Jiuzheng Yuan’an (对话念斌律师张燕生：要表扬法
官，鼓励他们纠正冤案) [Conversation with Nianbin’s Lawyer Zhang Yansheng:
We should complement the judges and encourage them to fix wrongful convictions],
PENGPAI
XINWEN
(澎湃新闻)
(Aug.
22,
2014),
http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1263125
(on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Wang Jianfa (王健), “Guonei Yizhi Beiguan Zuijiu de Yuanyu Fan” Chen
Man 23 Nian Hou Xuangao Wuzui (“国内已知被关最久的冤狱犯”陈满23年后宣
告无罪) [“The Longest Known Innocent Convict in the Nation” Chen Man
Pronounced Not Guilty After 23 Years], PENGPAI XINWEN (澎湃新闻) (Feb. 1, 2016),
http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1427938 (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Yi Yanyou (易延友), Chen Man An Shen Yuan Ji (陈满案申冤记)
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People’s Procuratorate took the case and petitioned to the Supreme
People’s Court.116 The case was retried in Zhejiang provincial high
court in 2016 and Chen Man was acquitted because the only
incriminating evidence was his own testimony and his testimony
was self-conflicting.117 Although Chen Man also told his lawyer
that he was tortured in 1992, the torture claim was not addressed
in the case.118
Two other subjects of highly publicized wrongful conviction
cases were not so lucky: Huge Jiletu and Nie Shubin, who
posthumously got their convictions overturned, were executed in
the 1990s before adoption of the requirement that the SPC had to
consider, review, and approve all death penalties.119
[Story of the Petition for Chen Man Case], XIYUANWANG (洗冤网) (Feb. 24, 2015),
http://www.xiyuanwang.net/html/cma_1298_1931.html (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also Liu Jing (刘
旌), Wei Juzhen (魏居娴) & Li Runyang(李润阳), Hainan Yi’an: “Chuanshuo Zhong
de Wuzheng” Rang Beigaoren Fuxing le 21 Nian (海南疑案：“传说中的物证”让
被告人服刑了21年) [Hainan Mysterious Case: “Mythical Evidence” Made
Defendant Serving 21 Years in Prison], PENGPAI XINWEN (澎湃新闻) (July 25,
2014), http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1257855 (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
116. Yi Yanyou (易延友), Chen Man An Shen Yuan Ji (陈满案申冤记) [Story of
the Petition for Chen Man Case], XIYUANWANG (洗冤网), Feb. 24, 2015,
http://www.xiyuanwang.net/html/cma_1298_1931.html (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
117. See High People’s Court of Zhejiang Province, Zhejiang Gaoyuan jiu
Chenman An Zaishen Wuzui Da Jizhe Wen (浙江高院就陈满案再审无罪答记者问)
[Zhejiang High Court Answers Questions from Journalists on Retrial and
Acquittal of Chen Man Case], SINA WEIBO (新浪微博) (Feb. 1, 2016, 10:13 AM),
https://weibo.com/p/1001603937651697836422 (explaining that apart from Chen
Man’s guilty confession, which was deemed “unstable” and “inconsistent,” there
was no other evidence to prove that Chen Man committed the crime) (on file with
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
118. See Wang Jianfa (王健), “Guonei Yizhi Beiguan Zuijiu de Yuanyu Fan”
Chen Man 23 Nian Hou Xuangao Wuzui (“国内已知被关最久的冤狱犯”陈满23年
后宣告无罪) [“The Longest Known Innocent Convict in the Nation” Chen Man
Pronounced Not Guilty After 23 Years], PENGPAI XINWEN (澎湃新闻) (Feb. 1, 2016),
http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1427938
(on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
119. Wang Xiaoyu (王筱渔), Huge Jiletu An Shimo: Bei Qiangbi 9 Nian Hou
Ling Yi Nanzi Gongshu Sharen Jingguo (呼格吉勒图案始末：被枪毙9年后另一男
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In the latest SPC report during the NPC session in March
2018, the SPC had overturned 39 wrongful convictions, involving
78 people in the last five years.120
Undoubtedly, all of the reform from 2012–2015 contributed to
the bold actions of criminal defense and human rights lawyers, all
to be dashed by the 709 Crackdown and subsequent repression.
IV. The Die-Hard Model
The “die-hard” lawyer model, though not the moniker, may
have started at least as early as 2007 or 2008, but perhaps in truth
as early as Tiananmen Square, when some of today’s die-hard
lawyers were cutting their social-consciousness teeth as student
demonstrators.121 Although the die-hard moniker has only been
applied to criminal defense lawyers, they are surely the close
relative of the slightly earlier-appearing group of Chinese lawyers
taking up social causes in the public interest, such as
representation of families of victims of the toxic baby formula

子供述杀人经过) [Beginning and End of the Huge Jiletu Case: Another Man
Confesses the Killing 9 Years after Execution], FENGHUANG JUJIAO (凤凰聚焦) (Nov.
12, 2014), http://news.ifeng.com/a/20141112/42452914_0.shtml (discussing Huge
Jiletu’s case) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice); Mengyuan 21 Nian, Nie Shubin Zaishen Zhonghuo Wuzui (蒙冤21年，聂
树斌案再审终获无罪) [Wronged for 21 years, Nie Shubin’s Retrial Finally Granted
Innocence], CAIXIN (财新) (Dec. 2, 2016), http://china.caixin.com/2016-1202/101021724.html (discussing Nie Shubin’s case) (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
120. Chinese Courts Redress 39 Wrongful Conviction Cases in Past 5 Years,
XINHUA (Feb. 5, 2018, 9:41:11 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/201802/05/c_136951210.htm (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice); Zhou Qiang (周强), President, Sup. People’s Ct., Work
Report to the Thirteenth National People’s Congress: Zuigao Renmin Fayuan
Gongzuo Baogao (最高人民法院工作报告) [Supreme People’s Court Work Report]
(Mar. 9, 2018).
121. See Gagging the Lawyers: China’s Crackdown on Human Rights Lawyers
and Implications for U.S.-China Relations: Hearing Before the Cong.-Exec.
Comm’n on China, 115th Cong. 7–8 (2017) [hereinafter Gagging the Lawyers]
(noting that some die-hard lawyers gained their courage from participation in the
1989 Tiananmen movement).
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produced by Sanlu Milk Co. in 2008.122 Criminal defense matters,
sometimes on behalf of organized crime suspects,123 may appear
unlike the cases against a politically well-connected milk company
or cases undertaken by American civil rights lawyers who did
criminal representation of protestors and activists, school
desegregation, voting rights and all manner of politically-charged
cases. But in China, all high-profile criminal prosecutions are
political.124 The affront implicit in challenging the State’s will, even
in an otherwise non-politically-charged criminal matter, is a far
different phenomenon than an American lawyer fighting hard for
her routine criminal defendant client.
In late December 2012, days before the new Chinese Criminal
Procedure Law took effect, the Criminal Committee of the Zhejiang
Provincial Bar Association issued a series of guidelines titled “Ten
Risks of Criminal Defense and Their Solutions.”125 One guideline
reads: “When disagreeing with the judge during a trial, a lawyer
shall state his/her opinions (for the record) and then follow the
presiding judge’s order and avoid direct confrontation. When the
122. See Teng Biao, Opinion, Chinese Human Rights Lawyers Under Assault,
WASH.
POST
(July
25,
2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/07/24/AR2009072402940.html (discussing the work of a
few dozen Chinese “rights lawyers” who, by 2009, experienced “success in
protecting the rights of individuals and in . . . [raising] awareness of the law
among people all across China”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Social Justice).
123. See Olesen, supra note 1 (discussing the representation of a person
accused of gang-related crimes in China by a team of so-called “diehard” lawyers).
124. See Jayshree Bajoria, Access to Justice in China, WASH. POST (Apr. 17,
2008,
10:14
AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/04/17/AR2008041701692.html (noting the direct
correlation between increased media coverage of a criminal prosecution and the
politicization of the case, which “reinforces [Party oversight over the courts” in
order to obtain “a judgment that quiets popular sentiment”) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
125. Su Hucheng (苏湖城), Lüshi Congshi Xingshi Bianhu Yewu Shida
Fengxiandian ji Caozuo Tishi (律师从事刑事辩护业务十大风险点及操作提示) [Ten
Risks of Lawyers Practicing Criminal Defense and Practicing Tips], Hualu (华律)
[HUALV.COM] (Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.66law.cn/domainblog/39964.aspx
(providing a list of practice tips in anticipation of the implementation of
amendments to criminal defense provisions in the Criminal Procedure Law) (on
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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court violates procedural rules, a lawyer shall file his/her
complaints in writing after the trial.”126 On its surface, this
admonition sounds little different from the American Bar
Association’s Model Rule instructing lawyers to obey even
erroneous orders of judges.127 But the cultural and systemic
differences between China and the United States make the
instructions quite different.
Obviously the Zhejiang Bar Association guidelines are trying
to protect defense lawyers from risky practice.128 However, after
the guidelines were posted online, surprisingly serious attacks
came from other members of the defense bar—members of the new
breed of co-called “die-hard” criminal defense lawyers. One defense
lawyer, who often takes hard lines against the court, mocked the
proposed guideline that defense lawyers should “defend[] clients
with bended knees, instead of straight legs.” This group of die-hard
lawyers repeatedly quoted the famous saying: “[T]he only thing
necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing!” In
other words, avoiding confrontation with a corrupt judge is nothing
but encouraging that judge to do more evil. When facing a corrupt
judge, in contrast, these die-hard lawyers not only lodge objections
at court, but also resort to live social media activity, disciplinary
complaints and street demonstrations to challenge the court.129
Two lawyers even handed a bag of sweet potatoes to the president
of a high court, suggesting that if the president does not protect
the people, he should go home and sell sweet potatoes (a traditional
Chinese saying).130
126. Id.
127. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 3.4(c), 3.5(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)
(“A lawyer shall not . . . knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a
tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation
exists”; “A lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.”).
128. See Su Hucheng, supra note 125 (providing a list of ten risks associated
with criminal defense practice).
129. See Gagging the Lawyers, supra note 121, at 7 (“So-called diehard
lawyers actively used the social media and street theater to activate supporters
and expose problems in defending their clients.”).
130. Li Meng (李蒙), Sike shi Yizhong Paibie Haishi Yizhong Fangfa? (死磕是
一种派别还是一种方法) [Is Sike a Faction or a Method?], MINZHU YU FAZHI (民主与
法制) [DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF L.] Vol. 17, 2014.
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V. New Methods Used by the Die-Hard Lawyer
In one sense, die-hard lawyers are simply more intense than
their traditional Chinese counterparts. A traditional Chinese
defense lawyer manages the defense-side evidence and makes
technical legal arguments.131 A somewhat more aggressive form of
traditional lawyer deeply and intensely analyzes the civil law
articles and makes incisive arguments about their application to
the defendant. But both traditional defense lawyers and their
slightly more probing, technical compatriots yield when it becomes
clear that the judge cannot or will not accept their arguments,
sometimes with the tacit understanding that the judge is being
controlled by forces outside the courtroom.132
The die-hard lawyer is certainly more aggressive in the first
instance. He or she does all that the technically-oriented
traditional lawyer does, but also vigorously pursues arguments
about the legality of the prosecution’s evidence and methods. The
die-hard lawyer challenges judges’ rulings on evidence admission
and procedural rights and does so vociferously.133 And the die-hard
lawyer does so even after it is clear that the judge will not be
permitted by others to rule in the defense’s favor.134 But in addition
to being more aggressive and more persistent, the die-hard lawyer
131. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa (中华人民共和国刑事诉
讼法) [Crim. Proc. L. of the People’s Republic of China], (promulgated by Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 7, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980, amended Mar.
14, 2012), ch. IV, https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/criminalprocedure-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china#body-chinese (describing the
rights of a criminal suspect to representation and the role of a criminal defense
lawyer) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
132. See
CECC,
Judicial
Independence
in
the
PRC,
https://www.cecc.gov/judicial-independence-in-the-prc (last visited Nov. 28, 2018)
(“China’s judiciary continues to be subject to a variety of internal and external
controls that significantly limit its ability to engage in independent decision
making.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
133. See Ye Zhusheng (叶竹盛), Sike Pai Lüshi (死磕派律师) [Die-hard sect],
RENMIN WENZHAI (人民文摘) [PEOPLE’S DIGEST] (describing lawyer Chi Yusheng’s
fierce and emotional protest against the presiding judge for interfering with the
illegal evidence exemption procedure in the Li Qinghong case).
134. See id. (discussing the various pressures affecting judicial decisions).
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uses tactics that are outside the walls of the courtroom and its
procedures.135
In particular, the die-hard lawyer uses social media as a tool
of advocacy.136 During the Li Qinghong trial, an “all-star team” of
defense lawyers blanketed the Chinese social media with news of
the proceedings, commenting on everything from errors in the
indictments to the disparate volume of the defense and prosecution
microphones.137 The media work was so intense that Weibo—a
Chinese version of Facebook and Twitter—updates were being sent
live from the courtroom by defense lawyers, and large segments of
the population were riveted to the news.
[L]awyers’ online activities can be traced back to the influential
case of Li Zhuang, a lawyer falsely prosecuted with perjury in
Chongqing, in 2010. While the voices of the official media
framing and blaming Li were dominating public opinion, the
defense had no choice but to tell the other side of the story via
social media.138

Such use of media to offset public information that cuts
against a defendant may cause some to think of Model Rule 3.6139
and Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,140 the Supreme Court case that
trimmed the rough edges from the earlier version of the Model Rule
and established the propriety of self-defense use of public
135. See Gagging the Lawyers, supra note 121, at 7 (“So-called diehard
lawyers actively used the social media and street theater to activate supporters
and expose problems in defending their clients.”)
136. See id. (“Through social media, activist lawyers could create instant
crowds to rush to a courthouse or defend a lawyer being harassed by police.”)
137. Zhang Xueran, China’s All Star Legal Team Pleas for Defendants’ Right
on Social Media, TEA LEAF NATION (July 25, 2012).
138. Id.
139. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 3.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018)
(providing restraints on a lawyer’s ability to make extrajudicial statements
regarding an investigation or litigation in which he or she is participating or has
participated).
140. See Gentile v. Nev. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1048 (1991) (finding a
Nevada Supreme Court Rule prohibiting a lawyer from making extrajudicial
statements to the press he knows or reasonably should know will have a
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding, but
allowing him to state without elaboration the general nature of the defense, is
void for vagueness).
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statements, especially those meant to counter negative media
reports about the defendant.141 But that quick leap would be
mistaken. The U.S. law on the subject is an effort to balance free
speech with fair trial, and specifically to protect the jury pool from
undue factual contamination regarding celebrated cases, while
respecting free speech rights of lawyers and media.142 By contrast,
the Chinese use of this balancing concept has nothing to do with
non-existent jury pools and ensuring an impartial lay fact-finder.
Instead, the Chinese use of social media by defense lawyers is an
effort to combat raw power of those in control of the justice system,
both judges and so-called “higher-ups,” CCP officials who can
control judges’ decisions.143
This use of social media, designed to create public pressure
and possible embarrassment of “higher ups” seems odd to some
Americans, simply because such a technique would be so unlikely
of success in influencing a U.S. judge. Ironically, it is the lack of
judicial independence in China that makes the technique viable.
141. See id. at 1056 (noting that rules restricting speech of criminal defense
attorneys must be scrutinized when, in comparison, “[t]he police, the prosecution,
other government officials, and the community at large hold innumerable
avenues for the dissemination of information adverse to a criminal defendant”).
142. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 3.6 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“It
is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair trial and
safeguarding the right of free expression.”).
Preserving the right to a fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment
of the information that may be disseminated about a party prior to
trial, particularly where trial by jury is involved . . . . On the other
hand, there are vital social interests served by the free dissemination
of information about events having legal consequences and about legal
proceedings themselves.
Id.
143. See Oleson, supra note 1 (noting die-hard lawyers’ extensive use of social
media to advocate for their clients and their combative posture towards corrupt
Party officials, the police and judges who have abused their power); see also
Nathan Vanderklippe, Thwarted by China’s Courts, ‘Diehard’ Lawyers ‘Fight to
the
Death’
for
Justice,
GLOBE
AND
MAIL
(Apr.
27,
2017),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/thwarted-by-chinas-courtsdiehard-lawyers-fight-to-the-death-for-justice/article34830997/
(noting
the
influence of local authorities on courtroom decisions, which leaves judges in China
with “very little independent authority”) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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The well-founded expectation of Chinese criminal defense lawyers
in high profile cases is that judges are told what to do by people
often referred to as “higher ups.”144 These higher ups are party
officials whose will is being done by local judges and prosecutors.145
Such orders from government officials were referred to as
“telephone justice” in Central and Eastern Europe during
communist times.146 Such orders, while not entirely unheard-of in
an independent court system, are both rare and, we would expect,
ineffectual. In such an independent court system, nothing much
would be gained in an individual case by generating public opinion.
But the taste of the Chinese public seems to have been whetted for
news of injustice, and the “higher ups,” while they wield mostly
unchecked power, do care about stirring the public ire.147 This is
just the trend and tendency that is being banked on by the die-hard
lawyer in the use of social media.148 The same phenomenon allows,
but does not ensure, that they will stay out of jail themselves.
These methods are far outside the norm for Chinese
lawyers.149 The methods themselves are used to advance both
client interests and to expose flaws in the Chinese criminal justice
system.150 Both the use of the methods and the goal of advancing a
144. See Benjamin L. Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the
Chinese Legal System, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 67 (2005) (“Higher-level officials
exert pressure on individual judges and courts . . . .”).
145. See id. (discussing higher-up officials who put pressure on judges and
courts to influence the outcome of a case).
146. See Volha Kananovich, ‘Execute Not Pardon’: The Pussy Riot Case,
Political Speech, and Blasphemy in Russian Law, 20 COMM. L. & POL’Y 311, 395
(discussing the practice of “telephone law” in Russia in which “outcomes of cases
allegedly [came] from orders issued over the phone by those with political power
rather than through the application of law”).
147. See Vanderklippe, supra note 143 (discussing a two-year campaign of the
Chinese government to arrest, detain, and intimidate die-hard lawyers as a way
of keeping them out of the media).
148. See id. (“[S]ome Chinese lawyers have turned to other means to defend
their clients, leveraging the power of social media and the occasional willingness
of political authorities to bend to public pressure.”).
149. See id. (“Such tactics have been controversial, and diehard lawyers have
been denounced in state media as ‘commandos’ and ‘activists’ who . . . have wild
intentions to challenge and change the law . . . .”).
150. See id. (“‘But I’m very sympathetic to why [die-hard lawyers] did it. It’s
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lawyer’s cause have drawn harsh rebuke from the Chinese legal
profession and from the state.151
The current term, die-hard lawyer appears to have originated
in connection with a high-profile criminal defense in 2012.152
[T]he term originated from a discussion . . . in Guiyang, the
capital of Southern China’s Guizhou province, in July 2012.
Yang [Xuelin, who identifies himself as a diehard lawyer on his
Weibo page] and a colleague named Chi Susheng were part of a
team of lawyers from around China who had come to the city to
defend a former property tycoon accused of gang-related crimes.
Over lunch on the first day of the trial, Chi complained the trial
was already not going well. It was riddled with procedural
problems, she said, and the team was going to have to “firmly
fight to the bitter end,” using the northern slang term sike—
which roughly means to fight to the bitter end, or to die hard. 153

The name stuck and has become a sensitive topic in China.154
What identifies a die-hard lawyer?
If there were a checklist for China’s “diehard lawyers faction” it
would probably read something like this: Must be combative,
dramatic, and have a flair for social media; must not be
intimidated by authority; and must be willing to spend time
under house arrest or in jail.155

It sounds like some U.S. civil rights cause lawyers, such as Bill
Kunstler, for example, would qualify.156

precisely because they couldn’t find justice in the courtroom.’”).
151. See id. (discussing a campaign by the Chinese government to intimidate
and jail die-hard lawyers and the denouncement of die-hard lawyers by the
Chinese media).
152. See Olesen, supra note 1 (“Beijing lawyer Yang Xuelin, who identifies
himself . . . as a “diehard,” told Communist Party mouthpiece newspaper People’s
Daily that the term originated from a discussion with [fellow lawyer Chi
Susheng] . . . in July 2012.”).
153. Id.
154. See Vanderklippe, supra note 143 (“The term, and the methods it evokes,
have become dangerous in a country that has actively targeted lawyers.”).
155. Olesen, supra note 1.
156. See infra Part IV (describing the career of civil rights lawyer William
Kunstler).
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Yang Jianlin wrote that the prerequisites of sike include: 1)
the prosecution obviously broke the law, 2) the client had already
decided to sike and requested the lawyer to sike, and 3) there were
no other legal remedy besides sike.157 The sike methods, Yang
summarized, include: 1) strictly adhering to the text of the law, 2)
the use of social media, 3) the use of the internal complaint system,
4) behavioral art, such as giving a sweet potato to the judge.158
Yang also said that sike only applies to criminal cases where the
power of the government and power of the defendant are
imbalanced.159 It is not appropriate to use the sike method in civil
cases.160 In addition, Yang thinks lawyers should only sike on
procedures and not substance issues because the only reason that
caused lawyers to sike is the illegality of the procedure rather than
the dispute of substance.161
The die-hard lawyer seems less concerned about the particular
client than the cause, and the cause is the advancement of justice
and the rule of law in the Chinese criminal justice system.162 They
care about procedural matters and about fundamental criminal
defense rights.163 They care about the accurate application of the
157. See Yang Xuelin (杨学林), Yang Xuelin Lüshi: Lun Sike Pai Lüshi (杨学
林律师：论死磕派律师) [Lawyer Yang Xuelin: On Sike Lawyers], BOXUN.COM, (July
31, 2017), https://www.boxun.com/news/gb/pubvp/2017/07/201707311218.shtml
(explaining the justifications for the use of the die-hard style of defense advocacy)
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
158. See id. (identifying the die-hards’ approach to statutory interpretation,
their use of social media, and their dramatic display of advocacy); id. (“The most
famous performance art is Yang Jinzhu and Li Jinxing’s ‘send sweet potato’ to the
Fujian High Court.”).
159. See id. (“It is precisely because some public authorities have deliberately
deprived the accused and defenders of their litigation rights with their own
strengths [that] the lawyers forced to die have to die.”).
160. See id. (“It can be seen that sike is not applicable to civil cases.”).
161. See id. (“As long as the procedure of the case-handling agency is lawful,
it is also possible for the lawyer to achieve the purpose of defense.”).
162. See Vanderklippe, supra note 143 (describing the inability of lawyers to
find justice in the courtroom as the reason why die-hard lawyers began using
radical means of client advocacy).
163. See id. (“Whenever there is a little procedural problem [die-hard lawyers]
will just fight to the death.”); see also Yang Xuelin, supra note 157 (describing
die-hard lawyers’ focus on procedural issues); Ye Zhusheng (叶竹盛), Sike Pai

THE NEW BREED, “DIE-HARD” CHINESE LAWYER

131

written law, as opposed to the law-of-the-moment as determined
by the wishes of the State.164 And the State is paying attention.165
They take cases where legal rights are being flouted,
regardless of the client. Their opponent is the court establishment,
namely the police[, the prosecution,] and even the judge. This
adversarial stance has caught the attention of China’s second
highest justice. “We are now seeing a very strange phenomenon,”
wrote Shen Deyong, the executive vice-president of the Supreme
People’s Court, China’s highest court, in a May 2013 essay
published in the Communist Party-run People’s Court Daily.
“[Defense] lawyers are not in a confrontation with prosecutors, but
instead are having confrontations with the presiding judge in the
case,” he complained.166
The State prefers that lawyers be technically-sound
practitioners who understand that their place is not to challenge
the will of the State.167 Chinese authorities strongly prefer that
Lüshi (死磕派律师) [The Die-Hard Sect], RENMIN WENZHAI (人民文摘) [PEOPLE’S
DIGEST] http://paper.people.com.cn/rmwz/html/2013-11/01/content_1354207.htm
(last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (explaining that lawyers will resort to die-hard tactics
if the court does not follow the Criminal Procedure Law) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
164. See Vanderklippe, supra note 143 (“‘In the courthouse, they stick to the
law to the extreme.’”); see also Yang Xuelin, supra note 157 (describing die-hard
lawyers’ insistence on the judiciary’s strict adherence to the law as written).
165. See Olesen, supra note 1 (“[T]he government is responding [to the
die-hard’s impact] with an ‘increasingly repressive policy’ that is trying to rein in
the legal profession.”); see also Alex W. Palmer, ‘Flee at Once’: China’s Besieged
Human Rights Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (July 25, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/magazine/the-lonely-crusade-of-chinashuman-rights-lawyers.html (describing the “709 Crackdown” on July 9, 2015,
during which “more than 300 rights lawyers and activists from across [China]
were targeted, with 27 forbidden to leave the country, 255 temporarily detained
or forcibly questioned and 28 held in government custody”) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
166. Olesen, supra note 1.
167. See Olesen, supra note 1 (“‘These activist lawyers, who have wild
intentions to challenge and change the law, have deviated’ from what their jobs
are supposed to entail . . . .” (quoting Shan Renping, Opinion, Legal Activists Must
Also
Respect
Rule
of
Law,
GLOBAL
TIMES
(May
8,
2014),
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/859107.shtml (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice)).
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“lawyers behave like dentists.”168 “In other words, the government
thinks attorneys should be ‘good technicians and not involve
themselves in cases of political-legal injustice.’”169 But it appears
that crackdowns against activist lawyers are only breeding new
activist lawyers and gaining them a public following.170 The
Chinese Law on Lawyers stipulates that a “lawyer must accept the
supervision of the state . . . .”171 The die-hard lawyers are treading
in new territory, and are not accepting the raw supervision of the
state. They place client and system reform interests above those of
the CCP.172 They are not necessarily seeking the destruction of
China, as the CCP would charge; instead, they seek what they
believe would be a better China, one more open to dissent and free
speech rights.173
Stories of harassment and even physical violence against
activist lawyers have become frequent.174 Threats, subtle and
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See id. (“[T]he crackdowns . . . are only growing the ranks of ‘angry
lawyers’ in China, causing more to take up rights-related cases.”).
171. Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Lüshi Fa (中华人民共和国律师法) [Law.
L of the People’s Republic of China], (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Sept. 1, 2017, effective Sept.1, 2017), art. 3.
172. See Palmer, supra note 165 (“[T]he rights lawyers were zealous,
outspoken and willing to challenge the government in ways their predecessors
would not have dared.”).
173. See Gagging the Lawyers: China’s Crackdown on Human Rights
Lawyers and Implications for U.S.-China Relations: Hearing Before the
Cong.-Exec. Comm’n on China, 115th Cong. 7–8 (2017) (statement of Terence
Halliday, Co-Director, Center on Law and Globalization, American Bar
Foundation) [hereinafter Statement of Terence Halliday] (describing the legal
ideals of die-hard lawyers).
174. See Palmer, supra note 165 (describing the treatment Chinese human
rights lawyers due to their controversial advocacy); see also Gagging the Lawyers:
China’s Crackdown on Human Rights Lawyers and Implications for U.S.-China
Relations: Hearing Before the Cong.-Exec. Comm’n on China, 115th Cong. 10
(2017) (statement of Teng Biao, Chinese Human Rights Lawyer, Visiting Scholar,
Institute for Advanced Study, and Co-Founder, the Open Constitution Initiative
and China Human Rights Accountability Center) [hereinafter Statement of Teng
Biao] (“[In the 709 crackdown, d]ozens of lawyers were severely tortured,
including beatings, electric shocks, sleep deprivation, death threats, months or
years of solitary confinement, so on and so on.”).
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overt, physical beatings, and even “disappearance” have
occurred.175 Cao Shunli, for example, was an activist who died in
detention after being denied medical treatment.176
The 709 Crackdown did not end the die-hard model in the
courtroom today. In December 2017, the defense lawyer in a highly
publicized arson case in Hangzhou staged a walk-out from the
court because he demanded the case to be tried in another province
to avoid pressure from the public and outside influence.177 Despite
the lawyers being rounded-up during the 709 Crackdown, the more
commonly known die-hard lawyers often stay away from political
cases, and only focus on criminal cases where abuses of power are
observed and potential wrongful convictions are on the edge.178
Those lawyers forced to disappear are all rights lawyers, while
regular die-hard lawyers are mostly safe from criminal
prosecution.179 However, two best known die-hard lawyers, Yang
Jingzhu and Li Jingxing, were both disciplined by the bar, and
Yang was recently disbarred after criticizing authorities with
obscene language and disturbing the courtroom.180
175. See Palmer, supra note 165 (discussing the disappearance of lawyers and
activists after the 709 crackdown and the use of “residential surveillance in a
designated location” under the Chinese criminal code).
176. Detained Chinese Lawyers Admit Guilt in Disorder Charges: State
Media, REUTERS (July 24, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/24/uschina-rights-lawyer-idUSKCN0PY0I020150724 (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
177. See Wang Jingwei, Yang Linxin & Ma Xiaolong, Hangzhou Baomu
Zonghuo An: Yichang Yiwai Zhongduan de Tingshen Beihou (杭州保姆纵火案：一
场意外中断的庭审背后) [Hangzhou Nanny Arson Case: Behind an Abruptly
Stopped
Trial],
XIN
JING
BAO
(新京报),
(2017),
https://www.weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309404187419451727886
(last
visited Oct. 13, 2018) (discussing a defense lawyer’s decision to withdraw from a
highly publicized arson case in China due to its illegality) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
178. See Alexa Olesen, Meet China’s Swaggering, ‘Diehard’ Criminal
Lawyers,
FOREIGN
POLICY
(May
16,
2014),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/16/meet-chinas-swaggering-diehard-criminallawyers/ (discussing the criminal defense nature of die-hard lawyers in China) (on
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
179. See id. (noting that the increased provocation of the government has
caused die-hard lawyers to take up more “rights-related cases”).
180. See War on Human Rights Lawyers Continues: Up to 16 More Lawyers in
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In 2011, 2014, and then most intensely since July 2015,
aggressive lawyers representing criminal defendants and human
rights activists have been abused by the State.181 The State
versions of events is that some lawyers have become criminals and
needed to be taught a lesson about proper lawyer activity in
China.182 For the most part, the crimes committed by these lawyers
are for stirring up trouble, picking quarrels, and inciting
subversion, which for the most part have no analog in US criminal
law.183 So, in one sense, the State is correct that these lawyers are
violating criminal law, but the laws and the conduct that violates
them would not be recognizable to Westerners as criminal.
China Face Disbarment or Inability to Practice, CHINA CHANGE (May 14, 2018),
https://chinachange.org/2018/05/14/war-on-human-rights-lawyers-continues-upto-16-more-lawyers-in-china-face-disbarment-or-inability-to-practice/ (detailing
the circumstances of Yang Jingzhu’s disbarment) (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also Te-Ping Chen, Chinese
Human-Rights Lawyer’s Legal License is Suspended, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-human-rights-lawyers-legal-license-issuspended-1480681832 (explaining that Chinese authorities suspended Li
Jinxing’s license to practice law for one year due to his courtroom behavior) (on
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
181. See Palmer, supra note 165 (describing the Chinese government’s
treatment of rights lawyers and activists over the past few decades, which
culminating in the 2015 Crackdown); see also Statement of Teng Biao, supra note
174 (describing his 2011 detainment in a “black jail” for 70 days due to his work
as a human rights lawyer); Gagging the Lawyers: China’s Crackdown on Human
Rights Lawyers and Implications for U.S.-China Relations: Hearing Before the
Cong.-Exec. Comm’n on China, 115th Cong. 12 (2017) (statement of Xia Chongyu,
Son of Imprisoned Human Rights Lawyer Xia Lin and a Student at Liberty
University) [hereinafter Statement of Xia Chongyu] (describing the 2014
abduction of his father due to his involvement in politically sensitive cases as a
human rights lawyer).
182. See Olesen, supra note 178 (describing die hard lawyers as being seen as
an enemy of China).
183. See Matt Ford, China’s Widening Crackdown on Lawyers, ATLANTIC (Jan
14., 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/01/chinalawyer-crackdown-arrest/424005/ (discussing subversion charges filed against
prominent Chinese human rights lawyers by the Chinese government and the
conviction of rights defense lawyer Pu Zhiqiang) (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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Since Xi Jinping took power, combating Western influence has
been one of his key goals.184 In June 2013, a documentary made by
China’s National Defense University went viral on the Internet,
alleging the United States was trying to sabotage the Chinese
regime through the use of social media and non-governmental
organizations.185 Scholars have noticed that releasing such videos
are common before a Party Congress or the National People’s
Congress (NPC), to get a sense of public reaction.186
The Party Congress that followed in November 2013
announced a series of reform plans, including legal reform.187 The
NPC has since passed a series of laws regulating foreign influence
in the country. In August 2014, the NPC started to revise the old
State Security Law, which was eventually broken into two laws,
the Anti-Spy Law, which became effective November 1, 2014, and
the new State Security Law, which became effective July 1,

184. See ROBERT D. BLACKWILL & KURT M. CAMPBELL, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, XI JINPING ON THE GLOBAL STAGE: CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY UNDER A
POWERFUL BUT EXPOSED LEADER 8 (2016) (explaining that Xi is “deeply suspicious
of Western values and intentions” and has “commissioned studies on that subject
and forced cadres to watch documentaries on the dangers of Western cultural
influence”).
185. See generally Jiaoliang Wusheng (较量无声) [Silent Struggle] (National
Defense University of People’s Liberation Army, Jiaoliang Wusheng (较量无声)
[Silent
Struggle],
YOUTUBE
(Nov.
15,
2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iUjkSJxJDcw (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also Huang Jingjing ‘Silent
Contest’ Silenced, GLOBAL TIMES (Nov. 17, 2013, 7:23:01 PM),
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/825489.shtml (describing the release and
content of the documentary) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
186. See Wang Peng (王鹏), Letter to the Editor, Cong Jiao Liang Wu Sheng
Kan Zhongmei Guanxi de Shanbian (从《较量无声》看中美关系的嬗变) [Looking
at Sino-U.S. Relations Through Silent Struggle], FIN. TIMES CHINESE, Nov. 12,
2013, http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001053398?print=y (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
187. See J. M., Reform in China: The Party’s New Blueprint, ECONOMIST:
ANALECTS (Nov. 16, 2013) https://www.economist.com/analects/2013/11/16/thepartys-new-blueprint (noting some of the reforms adopted at the Communist
Party’s Third Plenum) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights
& Social Justice).
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2015.188 The NPC started reviewing the Foreign NGO Law
December 2014.189 After several rounds of public comments, the
law was passed in April 2016 and became effective January 1,
2017.190
When the Chinese Communist Party perceives a threat to the
regime, it acts to suppress that threat. Before the July 2015
crackdown, there was an earlier wave of arrests in 2011, following
the Arab Spring, in which some lawyers (such as Teng Biao)
encouraged people to protest in the street.191 The Arab Spring was
188. Jiandief Fa Lifa (反间谍法立法) [Legislation of Anti-Spy Law,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/lfzt/rlys/node_25394.htm (last visited July 24, 2018)
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice);
Guojia Anquan Ri, Ni Budebu Zhi de Guojia Anquan Fa (国家安全日|你不得不知
的《国家安全法》) [National Security Day, the State Security Law that You Have
to
Know]
(Apr.
14,
2017),
http://china.huanqiu.com/article/201704/10475277.html (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights &
Social Justice); Quanguo Renda Changweihui Kaishi Shenyi Fan Jiandie Fa
Caoan (全国人大常委会开始审议反间谍法草案) [National People’s Congress
Standing Committee Started to Review Anti-Spy Law Draft] (Aug. 25, 2014),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/cwhhy/12jcwh/2014-08/26/content_1875442.htm (on
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice);
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Anquan Fa (中华人民共和国国家安全法)
[People’s Republic of China State Security Law] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 2015, effective July 1, 2015).
189. Simon Denyer, China Passes Tough Law to Bring Foreign NGOs Under
Security
Supervision,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
28,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinese-law-would-bring-civic-groupsunder-state-security-supervision/2015/03/23/5d8ad994-cce7-11e4-8730-4f473416
e759_story.html?utm_term=.0e8f9e64047d (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
190. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jingwai Feizhengfu Zuzhi Jingnei
Huodong Guanli Fa (中华人民共和国境外非政府组织境内活动管理法) [Law of the
People’s Republic of China on Administration of Activities of Overseas
Nongovernmental Organizations in the Mainland of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., April 28, 2016, effective Jan. 1, 2017,
amended
Nov.
4,
2017)
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/201711/28/content_2032719.htm (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
191. See James Fallows, Arab Spring, Chinese Winter, ATLANTIC (Sept., 2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/09/arab-spring-chinesewinter/308601/ (“[A] a large number of the country’s human-rights and
public-interest lawyers . . . were arrested or detained, or were disappeared . . . .”)
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probably the time when CCP really started to worry that foreign
influence could topple the regime.192 The propaganda videos
released after the 2015 crackdown also bluntly used the hashtag
“beware of color revolution.193 The term “color revolutions”
described the post-Soviet revolutions in Eastern Europe such as
Georgia’s Rose Revolution and Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.194
Under this overall theme, lawyers might be treated differently
under different administrations, but the overall direction of
repression and control by the state is the same. There were more
physical beatings in the 2011 arrests than during the 709
Crackdown, and in Gao Zhisheng’s autobiography, he explains that
he was held extra-judicially in secret prisons before 2011 and was
later detained in a more legalized manner (residential
surveillance) after Xi took power.195
During the Arab Spring, some Chinese scholars expected that
a similar wave may spread to other authoritarian regimes such as
China.196 The movement did not spread in China, but an isolated
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
192. See id. (explaining how the uprisings, social injustice and political
tensions threatened the CCP rule).
193. See Zheping Huang, The Complete Guide to China’s Propaganda Videos
Blaming the West for Almost Everything, QUARTZ (Aug. 8, 2016),
https://qz.com/751338/the-complete-guide-to-chinas-propaganda-videos-blamingthe-west-for-almost-everything/ (documenting the widespread support of a
propaganda video posted by a hip-hop group sponsored by the Communist Youth
League from the city of Chengdu that encouraged Chinese citizens to be wary of
American influence (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights &
Social Justice).
194. See THOMAS LUM & HANNAH FISCHER, CONG. RES. SERV., RL34729,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA: TRENDS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 2 (2009) (explaining
the fear that the combination of China’s foreign “democracy assistance” and the
involvement of international NGOs could bring about a “color revolution”).
195. See Tom Phillips, Gao Zhisheng: Persecuted Chinses Lawyer Smuggles
out
Book
of
Abuses,
GUARDIAN
(June
15,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/15/gao-zhisheng-persecutedchinese-dissident-smuggles-out-book-of-abuses (describing accounts of Gao’s
treatment contained in his memoir) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal
of Civil Rights & Social Justice). See generally GAO ZHISHENG (高智晟), 2017 NIAN
QILAI ZHONGGUO (2017年 起来中国) [2017 STAND UP CHINA] (2016) (describing the
torture Gao suffered during his detainment and imprisonment).
196. See Fallows, supra note 191 (explaining that “Jasmine” protests emerged
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“Jasmine Revolution” walk took place in Beijing’s busy commercial
street Wangfujing in February 2011.197 Video of U.S. Ambassador
Jon Huntsman on the scene was circulated on the internet and
many Chinese nationalists were angered by the foreigner’s
intention to interfere with the stability of the country.198 After the
Wangfujing incident, many dissidents and lawyers were
arrested.199 Those who were under investigation included Ai
Weiwei, Jiang Tianyong, Li Heping, and Teng Biao. Jiang
Tianyong recounted the interrogator asking him, “Do you really
think you can successfully take over the regime and interrogate us
in the future?”200 None of the lawyers or activists were criminally
charged at the time. Many of them, such as Jiang Tianyong and Li
Heping, were arrested again and convicted of crimes during the
2015 crackdown.201
“to extend the spirit of the Arab Spring protests to several major Chinese cities”);
see also Ying Chen, Is Arab Spring Coming to China? The Missing Piece of the
Puzzle, J. OF INT’L AFF., Nov. 5, 2013, https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/onlinearticles/arab-spring-coming-china-missing-piece-puzzle (“Similar to the factors
underlying the Arab Spring, social drivers of popular discontent in China are
many . . . [t]hese factors have created accumulated tensions in China, fueling a
growing problem of social instability.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
197. Fallows, supra note 191.
198. See id. (explaining that Senator Hunstman’s appearance at the event
was damaging and referencing a video of the event where a Chinese man can be
yelling at Senator Huntsman, “You want chaos for China, don’t you?”); see also
Shane2406, U.S. Ambassador Jon Huntsman Spotted at Wangfujing Protest in
Beijing,
YOUTUBE
(Nov.
22,
2011),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0_dNNLeaw1s (showing Senator Huntsman
at the Wangfujing incident) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
199. See Fallows, supra note 191 (explaining that the Chinese government
responded to the “Jasmine” protests by putting pressure on Chinese citizens
involved in politics).
200. Ai Weiwei, Ai Weiwei’s Interview with Lawyer Jiang Tianyong, YOUTUBE
(Feb. 18, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3WyQudKiNk&t=5s (on file
with Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
201. See China: Latest Information on Crackdown Against Lawyers and
Activists, AMNESTY INT’L (Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.amnesty.org/en/pressreleases/2015/08/china-list-of-lawyers-and-activists-targeted/ (documenting the
lawyers and activists targeted by police in the 2015 crackdown) (on file with the
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The state security apparatus was also using different
strategies on different people. In terms of foreigner versus
Chinese, the state portrays itself as protecting the Chinese against
subversive foreign powers. In terms of older, more experienced
lawyers versus their younger and junior associates, the state
played the role of a “protector” that prevented the naïve youngsters
from stepping into the wrong direction in following the influence of
a more experienced lawyer or mentor.
In January 2016, China arrested Peter Dahlin, a Swedish
legal NGO worker who had sponsored Fengrui Law Firm’s work.202
In the news article, Peter Dahlin was accused of not properly
registering his activities in China, avoiding financial supervision,
receiving sponsorship from seven different foreign NGOs, and
hyping up negative news and agitating conflicts against the
government.203 He was released and expelled from China after he
made a confession that was broadcasted on the television.204
Li Heping’s 24-year-old associate Zhao Wei was detained for a
year and released on parole with a letter confessing that she was
being manipulated as a “chess piece” and denounced Li Heping’s
work of “subversion.”205 In her letter, she described her dream of
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
202. Xinhuashe: Zhongguo Pohuo Yi Weihai Guojia Anquan Anjian, Yi
Ruidian Xianfan Bei Jianshi Juzhu (新华社：中国破获一危害国家安全案件，一瑞
典嫌犯被监视居住) [Xinhua: China Cracks a State Security Case, One Swedish
Suspect Under Residential Surveillance], PENGPAI XINWEN (澎湃新闻) (Jan. 19,
2016), https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_foward_1422494 (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
203. Id.
204. China Deports Detained Swedish Civil Rights Activist Peter Dahlin,
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 26, 2016). See generally Zhifa Bumen Pohuo
Yiqi Weihai Guojia Anquan Anjian, Zhongwai Xianfan Bei Yifa Caiqu Xingshi
Qiangzhi Cuoshi (执法部门破获一起危害国家安全案件 中外嫌犯被依法采取刑事强
制措施) [Law Enforcement Cracks a State Security Case, Chinese and Foreign
Suspects Under Criminal Custody According to Law], CCTV NEWS (Jan. 20, 2016),
http://news.cntv.cn/2016/01/20/VIDEEKYr4ld4N9Jh0oXJZC0K160120.shtml (on
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
205. Tom Phillips, China to Release Human Rights Worker Zhao Wi on Bail
After a Year of Detention, GUARDIAN (July 7, 2016); see Zhao Wei (@考拉就是考拉
), Zhi Pengyoumen de Yifeng Xin (致朋友们的一封信) [A Letter to Friends], SINA
WEIBO
(July
7,
2016,
8:07
PM)
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bringing positive change to the society and how her dream was
manipulated by the rights lawyers.206 She regretted her naivety
and vowed to start a new life.207
The same protection mentality can be found in various official
public service messages. In a poster made by Beijing State Security
Bureau, posted at the entrances of some busy subway stations, a
man had his head down, face covered by the hands.208 The big
caption reads “you can turn back!” and, referencing article 28 of
the Anti-Spy Law, suggests that if you were being recruited or
coerced into spying against or subverting China, you may turn
yourself in and be exonerated from criminal liability if you show
remorse.209
The state security also uses different tactics while detaining
different people. Following his detention and torture, Gao
Zhisheng recounted a conversation with a sympathetic police
officer who told him that he was tortured because he was willing
to make concessions after being tortured and that Liu Xiaobo was
never tortured because the police knew torture would not work on
Liu.210
In May 2014, “Pu Zhiqiang, a Beijing-based civil rights lawyer,
was detained by Beijing police . . . on the charge of provoking
troubles . . . .”211 Later, in 2016, Pu was disbarred and jailed for
“crossing the line” between lawyer and activist by daring to attend
twenty-fifth anniversary Tiananmen Square commemorative
events.212 Indeed the events commemorated his own actions

https://weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309403994696165783381 (original post
deleted, repost may be found at http://blog.dwnews.com/post-900336.html)
(describing Zhao’s personal regret for hurting China by working for Heping) (on
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
206. A Letter to friends, supra note 205.
207. Id.
208. See Poster from Beijing State Security Bureau (on file with author).
209. Id.
210. See GAO, supra note 195, at 118.
211. Shan Renping, Opinion, Legal Activists Must Also Respect Rule of Law,
GLOBAL TIMES (May 8, 2014), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/859107.shtml
(on file at the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
212. Id.
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because he was there on June 4, 1989.213 Because a person cannot
be a lawyer if he or she has a serious criminal conviction, Pu’s
convictions made his disbarment inevitable.214
Pu Zhiqiang (浦志强) was convicted of “inciting ethnic hatred”
(煽动民族仇恨) and “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” (寻衅
滋事) in December 2015 and was sentenced to a three-year
suspended sentence.215 He had already been confined for about
nineteen months at the time of his conviction.216
The only evidence against Pu were seven social media posts
that Pu wrote on Weibo between 2011 and 2014.217 To Western
eyes, his social media posts are ordinary comment and criticism of
government actions and policies. He was arrested in May 6, 2014,
three days after he had a meeting commemorating the June 4th
Anniversary of Tiananmen Square.218 Several other participants
were also arrested.219 Pu was initially investigated under the
charges of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” (寻衅滋事) and
“illegally obtaining personal information” (非法获取公民个人信息

213. Id.
214. Chinese Rights Lawyer Pu Zhiqiang Convicted, but to be Released Soon
After Receiving Three-Year Suspended Jail Sentence, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
(Dec. 22, 2015, 10:26 AM), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policiespolitics/article/1893795/chinese-rights-lawyer-pu-zhiqiang-convicted-be-released
(“Pu’s lawyer’s licence [sic] would be permanently revoked as convicted lawyers
were barred from practising [sic] . . . .”) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
215. Pu Zhiqiang: China RightsLawyer Gets Suspended Jail Sentence, BBC
NEWS (Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-35157525 (on
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
216. See id.
217. See Patrick Boehler, China’s Case Against a Civil Rights Lawyer, in
Seven
Social
Media
Posts,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
14,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/15/world/asia/pu-zhiqiang-china-trial-weiboposts.html (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
218. Andrew Jacob, China to Prosecute Pu Zhiqiang for Activism, N.Y. TIMES
(June 13, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/14/world/asia/formal-arrestannounced-of-chinese-human-rights-lawyer-Pu-Zhiqiang.html (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
219. Id.
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).220 He was later additionally charged with “inciting subversion of
the state” (煽动分裂国家罪) and “inciting ethnic hatred and ethnic
discrimination” (煽动民族仇恨、民族歧视罪).221 The latter charge
stemmed from his social media posts in support of the Uyghars, a
predominantly Muslim population living mostly in the Xinjiang
Autonomous Region of China.222 The post criticized the Chinese
government treatment of the Uyghars.223
Pu Zhiqiang was detained for more than a year before the
criminal charges were brought against him.224 The prosecutor and
police used all the extensions available under the Criminal
Procedure Law to detain him without formal charges.225 The
Beijing No. 2 Intermediate Court extended the time before the trial
period twice, adding an additional six months.226
Pu Zhiqiang had participated in the hunger strike in
Tiananmen Square in 1989 when he was a law student at China
University of Politics and Law (CUPL).227 He obtained his lawyer’s
license in 1995 and started to practice law in 1997.228 Since 2009,
Pu had worked on several high-profile cases including Tan Zuoren
case, Ren Jiayu’s Reeducation through Labor case, Ai Weiwei tax
220. Pu Zhiqiang: China Rights Lawyer Gets Suspended Jail Sentence, supra
note 215.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See id. (“[Pu Zhiqiang] had questioned the ‘excessively violent’
crackdown on Uighurs in the restive Xinjiang region, alleged the Chinese
Communist Party was an untruthful party, and mocked government rhetoric over
disputed islands in the East China Sea.”).
224. Id.
225. See id.
226. See Chinese Blogger Released After Six-Month Detention, GUARDIAN
(Aug. 10, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/10/chineseblogger-ran-yunfei-released (discussing the six-month detention of Pu Zhiqiang)
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
227. Pu Zhiqiang: Buzai shi Lüshi le, dan Xiangxin Weilai (浦志强：不再是律
师了，但相信未来) [Pu Zhiqiang: No Longer a Lawyer, but Believe in Future],
DUAN CHUAN MEI
(端传媒) [INITIUM
MEDIA]
(Apr.
15,
2016),
https://theinitium.com/article/20151214-dailynews-puzhiqiang/ (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
228. Id.
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case, and Tang Hui’s Reeducation through Labor case.229
(Re-education through labor was abolished under Xi Jinping’s legal
reform in 2014.)230
Lawyers such as Pu seem to be the forerunners of today’s
die-hard criminal defense lawyers. An editorial explains:
The problem is some of them have deliberately crossed the
bottom line of the rule of law. It was reported that Pu was
detained after he attended an anniversary event to
commemorate the June 4th incident [Tiananmen Square
resistance]. Whether there is a connection has not been
officially confirmed, but it is obvious that such an event, which
is related to the most sensitive political issue in China, has
clearly crossed the red line of law.231

The problem, of course, is that the word “law” has two distinct
meanings in China.232 On one hand, it is the words of the
law-makers written in official codes.233 But “law” also appears to
mean whatever is today’s will of those in power.234 It is this latter
sense in which Pu clearly crossed the line, and Chinese activists
and scholars are sensitive every day to where that line may be. The
229.
230.

Id.
See Sui-Lee Wee, China to Abolish Labor Camps, Major Victory for Xi,
REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2013, 10:59 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chinareform-legal/china-to-abolish-labor-camps-major-victory-for-xiidUSBRE9AE0TV20131115 (noting China’s plans to abolish its system of forced
labor camps in 2014) (on file with Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights &
Social Justice).
231. Shan Renping, supra note 211.
232. See Josh Chin, ‘Rule of Law’ or ‘Rule by Law’? In China, a Preposition
Makes
All
the
Difference,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Oct.
20,
2014),
https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/10/20/rule-of-law-or-rule-by-law-inchina-a-preposition-makes-all-the-difference/ (explaining that the Chinese
phrase fazhi (法治)has been translated into English as both “rule of law” and “rule
by law”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
233. See id. (explaining that “‘rule of law’ implies fairness and predictable
application” and constrains the power of political leaders by laws and
regulations).
234. See id. (“‘Rule by law’ would include, for example, rule under Hitler’s
Nuremberg Laws (Nürnburger Gesetze), which were neither fair nor predictably
applied.”).
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accuracy of their perceptions and judgments in this regard is what
keeps them out of jail.
In July 2015, a significant round-up and detention of
aggressive Chinese lawyers, dubbed the 709 Crackdown,
occurred.235 This round-up and detention significantly increased
the tension between the state and the activist lawyers, and so far,
despite serious risk to themselves, the lawyers are not backing
down.236 The rights lawyers rounded up included both aggressive
criminal defense lawyers and lawyers who have represented
unpopular clients in assertive civil rights cases. Some of the
lawyers’ whereabouts still remain unknown and nearly all were
denied the opportunity to meet with their own lawyers. In one
instance, the client of one of the detained lawyers made a request
for information regarding his lawyer’s whereabouts, but no
response or information was forthcoming. Family members of some
of the lawyers have been detained and questioned. Some of those
detained have been warned against inquiring further about their
loved ones. Other lawyers who were detained and released have
been warned against pursuing the whereabouts of the stilldetained lawyers.
This detention, even without criminal charge, is made possible
by a provision of the Criminal Procedure Code, Residential
Surveillance in a Designated Location (RSDL).237 Despite the use
235. Anthony Kuhn, Chinese Authorities Detain Nearly 150 Human Rights
Lawyers,
NPR
(July
14,
2015),
http://www.npr.org/2015/07/14/422952236/chinese-authorites-detain-nearly-150human-rights-lawyers (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights
& Social Justice); Chun Han Wong, Human-Rights Lawyers Detained in China
Confess, State Media Reports, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/human-rights-lawyers-detained-in-china-confessstate-media-reports-1437307686 (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Social Justice).
236. See Andrew Jacobs & Chris Buckley, China Targeting Rights Lawyers in
a
Crackdown,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
22,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/world/asia/china-crackdown-human-rightslawyers.html (noting that many activist lawyers are not being deterred by the
“intense political pressure” and “previous imprisonment of lawyers under
President Xi Jingping”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights
& Social Justice).
237. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa (中华人民共和国刑事诉
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of the word “residential,” nothing about this status resembles a
house arrest. Instead, the detainee is typically kidnapped without
warning, placed in a police car with a bag over the detainee’s head
and taken to an unspecified location. Unless charges are brought
or the status renewed, the detention can last six months. Typically,
neither family nor the detainee’s lawyer are told about the
detainee’s whereabouts. Thus, the term “disappeared” has been
applied to this status of detention.238
During the RSDL detention, food depravation, sleep
deprivation, intense interrogation, threats to family, and
occasional physical violence mark the experience of the
disappeared person.239
One goal appears to be to dissuade and intimidate the detainee
and others from engaging in the aggressive lawyering that brought
on the detention in the first place. A second goal is to extract a
guilty plea, resulting in the disbarment of the lawyer, and a video
confession to be publicly broadcast and written about in state print
media.240 The video confessions are often bizarre, staged events.
The confessions are tightly scripted, rehearsed and done in many

讼法) [Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China], art. 64, 72–77
(promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 7, 1979, effective Jan.
1, 1980, amended Mar. 14, 2012).
238. See generally THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF THE DISAPPEARED (Michael
Caster ed., 1st ed. 2017); Anthony Kuhn, Chinese Authorities Detain Nearly 150
Human
Rights
Lawyers,
NPR
(July
14,
2015),
http://www.npr.org/2015/07/14/422952236/chinese-authorites-detain-nearly-150human-rights-lawyers (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights
& Social Justice); see also generally Chun Han Wong, Human-Rights Lawyers
Detained in China Confess, State Media Reports, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/human-rights-lawyers-detained-in-china-confessstate-media-reports-1437307686 (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Social Justice); Andrew Jacobs & Chris Buckley, China Targeting
Rights Lawyers in a Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/world/asia/china-crackdown-human-rightslawyers.html (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
239. See supra note 238.
240. See SAFEGUARD DEFENDERS, SCRIPTED AND STAGED: BEHIND THE SCENES
OF CHINA’S FORCED TV CONFESSIONS (2018).
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takes to get the desired effect.241 In the confessions, the detainees
make statements that are entirely out of character and appear
obviously to be nothing more than the price of release, along with
the criminal conviction that follows.
State media has reported extensively on the confessions of the
detained lawyers. Among the chief targets of the crackdown, Zhou
Shifeng, was the lawyer who represented families of victims of the
toxic baby formula produced by Sanlu Milk Co. in 2008.242 Media
reports his confession to the charges leveled against himself and
his firm, charges “ranging from hyping up legal cases to spreading
smears against China’s legal system.”243 The publicized
confessions that precede any hearings or taking of evidence by a
court have been a common feature of previous crackdowns against
dissidents. To date, the public confessions seem not to have
dampened the spirits of the rights lawyers.244
In August 2016, four activists who were among those rounded
up in July 2015 were sentenced for the crime of subverting state
power.245 Beijing lawyer Zhou Shifeng was among the four and was
241. See id.
242. See Teng Biao, Opinion, Chinese Human Rights Lawyers Under Assault,
WASH.
POST
(July
25,
2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/07/24/AR2009072402940.html (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also Detained
China Human Rights Lawyer ‘Confesses’: State, BUS. INSIDER (July 19, 2015),
http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-detained-china-human-rights-lawyerconfesses-state-media-2015-7 (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
243. Chun Han Wong, Human-Rights Lawyers Detained in China Confess,
State
Media
Reports,
WALL
ST.
J.
(July
19,
2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/human-rights-lawyers-detained-in-china-confessstate-media-reports-1437307686 (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Social Justice).
244. See CHINESE HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS, THEY TARGET MY HUMAN
RIGHTS WORK AS A CRIME (2017).
245. See Subversion of State: ‘There’s no place for Outlaws’, CHINA DAILY (Aug.
8, 2016), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-08/08/content_26379881.htm
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see
also China Justified in Punishing Subversion, GLOBAL TIMES (Aug. 5,
2016), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/998684.shtml (expressing an editorial
opinion that claims of free speech are misguided defenses to “intolerable crimes
that threaten national security”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
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said to have influenced the others toward Western-style, open
protest against Chinese law. Two of the other three were said to
have operated an “illegal church.” The cases of the four, Zhou
Shifeng (周世锋), Hu Shigen (胡石根), Zhai Yanmin (翟岩民), and
Gou Hongguo (勾洪国) were tried together in Tianjin Intermediate
Court. They were all convicted of “subversion of the state” [颠覆国
家政权罪] and all promised not to appeal.246 Zhou Shifeng was
sentenced to seven years in prison under “subversion of the state”
in Tianjin.247 Hu Shigen was sentenced for seven years and six
months on August 3, 2016.248 Zhai Yanmin was sentenced for three

Civil Rights & Social Justice).
246. See Zhou Shifeng Deng Ren Dianfu Guojia Zhengquan An Yishen
Xuanpan (周世锋等人颠覆国家政权案一审宣判) [Sentencing Announced for the
First Trial of Zhou Shifeng and Others], CCTV NEWS (Aug. 5, 2016),
http://tv.cctv.com/2016/08/05/VIDENH2aEqLx40UiH3XJnMMl160805.shtml
(including the sentencing of Zhou, Hu, Zhai, and Gou) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
247. See Zhou Shifeng Bei Rending Fan Dianfu Guojia Zhengquan Zui:
Yishen Panchu Youqituxing 7 Nian (周世锋被认定犯颠覆国家政权罪：一审判处有
期徒刑7年) [Zhou Shifeng Was Convicted of Subversion of the State Regime: First
Trial
Sentenced
for
7
Years],
CCTV NEWS
(Aug.
4,
2016),
http://tv.cctv.com/2016/08/04/VIDEWgZmFo4IG2QKjJnCZfJ5160804.shtml
(showing Zhou confessing his wrongdoing, praising the fairness of the court, and
promising to “never appeal” the court’s decision) (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
248. Hu Shigen Bei Pan Youqituxing Qinian Liugeyue (胡石根被判有期徒刑七
年六个月) [Hu Shigen Was Sentenced for Seven Years and Six Months], XINHUA
WANG
(新华网)
[XINHUA.NET]
(Aug.
3,
2016),
https://weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309351000444004352497951926&u=5031
100920&m=4004364224066745&cu=5031100920&ru=2997829562&rm=4004359
865822737 (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice); see Hu Shigen Dianfu Guojia Zhengquan An Yishen Xuanpan, Hu
Shigen Huoxing Qinian Ban, Dangting Biaoshi Bu Shangsu (胡石根颠覆国家政权
案一审宣判 胡石根获刑七年半 当庭表示不上诉) [Hu Shigen Subversion of State
Regime Case First Trial, Hu Shigen Sentenced to Seven and a Half Years, Pledged
Not
to
Appeal
in
Court],
CCTV
NEWS
(Aug.
3,
2016),
http://tv.cctv.com/2016/08/03/VIDEzubE11c91cZN1Wy8PDq1160803.shtml
(showing Hu sentenced with the most severe punishment because he was the
leader of the group and a repeated offender of “subversion”; also shows his
confession and promise not the appeal) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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years with four more years suspended.249 Gou Hongguo was
sentenced to three years in prison with a three year suspension on
August 5, 2016.250
Some US Embassy staff went to the Tianjin court on their
diplomatic car. State security filmed the US diplomats and the
diplomatic car and made a video mocking US involvement. The
Ministry of Public Security posted the video on its Weibo account
and generated a wave of nationalist reaction on the social media.251
249. See Zhai Yanmin Dianfu Guojia Zhengquan An Yishen Xuanpan: Zhai
Yanmin bei Pan Youqituxing Sannian, Huanxing Sinian (翟岩民颠覆国家政权案
一审宣判：翟岩民被判有期徒刑三年，缓刑四年) [Zhai Yanmin Subversion of State
Regime Case Sentenced: Zhai Yanmin Sentenced to Three Years, with Suspension
of
Four
Years],
CCTV
NEWS
(Aug.
3,
2016),
http://tv.cctv.com/2016/08/03/VIDEUoXxaPM3uivvQJEPO474160803.shtml
(showing Zhai’s confession, especially about his participation of an underground
church involving rights lawyers, organized by Hu Shigen) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
250. Gou Hongguo Shexian Dianfu Guojia Zhengquan Xuanpan, Huoxing
Sannian Huanxing Sannian(勾洪国涉嫌颠覆国家政权宣判，获刑三年缓刑三年)
[Gou Hongguo Subversion of State Regime Case Sentenced: Three Years with
Three
Years
Suspension],
SINA
NEWS
(Aug.
5,
2016),
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/nd/2016-08-05/doc-ifxutfpf1290837.shtml;
see
also
http://tv.cctv.com/2016/08/05/VIDEuJv0wacx0pPy3ofwaDld160805.shtml
(showing Gou’s confession, praising the fairness of the court, and promising not
to appeal) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
251. See Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Gōng’ānbù (中华人民共和国公安部)
[Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China], SINA WEIBO (Aug.
3, 2016, 19:45 PM), https://weibo.com/2328516855/E1Sq5uRSB?type=comment
(video from original post was taken down, a repost of the video may be found at a
local police department’s Weibo post at http://t.cn/RtXY10N) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also “Weiquan
Quan” de Muhou Heishou, “Weiquan Shi” Zishi: “Lüshi” Goulian “Fangmin”(“维
权圈”的幕后推手“维权式”滋事：“律师”勾连“访民”) [The Hand Behind the
“Rights Protection Circle,” Inciting Trouble in “Rights Protection Style”: “Lawyers”
Collude
with
“Petitioners”],
CCTV
NEWS
(July
12,
2015),
http://news.cntv.cn/2015/07/12/VIDE1436662081249696.shtml (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); Fengrui Lüshisuo
Zuian Diaocha (锋锐律师所罪案调查) [Investigation of Fengrui Law Firm’s
Criminal
Case],
CCTV
NEWS
(July
19,
2015),
http://news.cntv.cn/2015/07/19/VIDE1437264109686345.shtml (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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In its editorial, the state newspaper said:
Lawyers advocate for the law. But a few of them went to the
other side of the law, and at one time won a certain degree of
response on the Internet. This reflects how seriously the
Western ideology has been infiltrating the country. Confronting
the country’s basic political system, and inciting people to resist
the country’s laws, the lawyers believed they were acting
through freedom of expression. It is ridiculous. 252

The various defendants made uncharacteristic statements as
part of their confessions to the charges, apparently reducing their
sentences. Gou Hongguo pleaded guilty to subverting state power
by “collude[ing] with a group of religious people, petitioners,
lawyers and legal administrators to agitate in controversial cases
and incite public hatred against the State . . . .”253 Guo said at his
sentencing: “I’m grateful to the government for saving me and
resolve not to participate in any criminal activities and will make
a clean break with all those anti-government forces.”254 Hu Shigen,
former college professor from Beijing and head of the illegal
church, said the “trial was fair and just” and thanked the
authorities for making sure he was properly treated for his
“diseases.”255 Hu had “teamed up with some lawyers to embarrass
the government” and promote a “peaceful transformation
overthrow of the government leadership.256 These were the very
lawyers, several like Zhou from the Fengrui law firm, who engaged
in the aggressive tactics of the new breed of Chinese lawyer.
Another Fengrui lawyer, Wang Yu 王宇, slated to receive a
human rights award from the American Bar Association, was
“released on parole awaiting trial” [取保候审] on July 22, 2016 after
a six-month detention.257 Her statement258 accompanying her
252. China Justified in Punishing Subversion, supra note 245.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See Subversion of State, supra note 245, at 5.
256. Id.
257. See generally THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF THE DISAPPEARED, supra note
238, at 65–84 (describing more of Wang Yu’s personal story, including the
detention details and threats to her son).
258. See (王宇) [Wang Yu], Wo Weishenme Zai Dianshi Shang Renzui (我为什
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release said that the ABA was using her to publicly smear the
Chinese legal system.259 She publicly vowed to refuse to accept any
such awards. “I am Chinese. I love my homeland. I’m not going to
accept the award issued by foreigners.”260 Similar to other smear
videos, the Communist Party League posted a video mocking the
ABA giving an award to a chair261 (referring to the Nobel Peace
Prize to Liu Xiaobo in 2010, when Liu was serving a prison
sentence in China and the Nobel Prize ceremony reserved an
empty chair on the podium honoring Liu.).
The crackdown against such lawyers has persisted. Most
recently, Yu Wensheng (余文生) was arrested on January 19, 2018
for circulating an open letter calling for amending the
constitution.262 Since his arrest, Yu’s wife Xu Yan had been

么在电视上认罪) [Why did I Confess on TV], DUAN CHUAN MEI (端传媒) [INITIUM
MEDIA] (June 5, 2018), https://theinitium.com/article/20180604-taiwan-wangyuconfession/ (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice); see also Zhao Wen Tian Xia (朝闻天下) [Behind the Illegal Smuggling
Case: Weaving Lies, Hiding Innocent Youth into Tools], CCTV (Oct. 17, 2015),
http://news.cntv.cn/2015/10/17/VIDE1445038921662355.shtml
(filmed
after
Wang Yu’s son was caught crossing the border; Interviewed in detention facility,
broadcasted Oct. 17, 2015) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice); (锋锐律所王宇取保候审：不接受“国际人权奖”) [Feng Rui
Law Firm Wang Yu is on bail pending trial: does not accept the "International
Human Rights Award"], IFENG.COM (Aug. 01, 2016), http://inews.ifeng.
com/yidian/49698903/news.shtml?ch=ref_zbs_ydzx_news (filmed after Wang
Yu’s release from detention and interviewed in a garden of a hotel, broadcasted
Aug. 1, 2016) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
259. See CHINESE HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS, supra note 245, at 5.
260. Id.
261. See (@共青团中央) [Communist Youth League Central], American Bar
Association’s Awarding Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, SINA WEIBO (Aug. 6, 2016,
22:42
PM),
https://weibo.com/3937348351/E2lRlBrSV?refer_flag=1001030103_
&type=comment (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
262. Joanna Chiu, China Detains Rights Lawyer After Call for Reform,
YAHOO! NEWS (Jan. 19, 2018), https://uk.news.yahoo.com/china-detains-rightslawyer-call-reform-035507714.html (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal
of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see Joanna Chiu (@joannachiu), TWITTER (Jan.
18, 2018, 7:10 PM), https://twitter.com/joannachiu/status/954189316653170688
(tweeting Yu Wensheng’s letter calling for constitutional amendment) (on file
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advocating for Yu’s release and met with several foreign media and
embassies. Xu was detained by the police for several hours on April
1 and was told not to speak up about the case. Yu Wensheng was
formally charged for “inciting subversion of the state” [煽动颠覆国
家政权罪] and “obstruction of public service” [妨碍公务罪].263
Yu’s lawyer license was revoked by the Beijing Justice Bureau
on January 15, 2018.264 The official reason was that Yu was
unemployed by any law firms for more than six months, a technical
requirement of the Chinese Lawyer Law.265 Yu said the
government forced his former employer to discharge him and
threatened other law firms not the hire him.266 He was also not
able to register his own law firm because of obstacles from the
government.267
Before his arrest, Yu Wensheng recorded a video claiming that
he would not give up his right to choose his own attorney unless
tortured.268
Yu Wensheng was one of the lawyers hired by Wang
Quanzhang’s wife, Li Wenzu, to defend Wang’s case, but he was
not able to meet with Wang (none of the 709 lawyers were able to
meet with lawyers hired by their families). Wang Quanzhang is
still being detained today after more than a thousand days of

with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
263. Changyi Xiuxian Beizhua, Lu Weiquan Lüshi zao Zhengshi Daibu (倡议
修宪被抓，陆维权律师遭正式逮捕) [Initiative to Amend the Constitution and Lu
Weiquan Lawyer Yu Wensheng was Formally Arrested], ZHONG YANGSHE (中央社)
[CENTRAL
NEWS
AGENCY]
(Apr.
20,
2018),
http://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/201804200219-1.aspx (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
264. Yu Wensheng Lüshizheng bei Zhuxiao, Cheng zao Zhengfu “Daya Baofu”(
余文生律师证被注销，称遭政府“打压报复”) [Yu Wensheng’s Lawyer License
Revoked, Claimed “Retaliation” from the Government], BBC NEWS CHINESE (Jan.
17, 2018), http://www.bbcarabic.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-42710495 (on
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. Hong Kong Free Press, ‘I Will Not Accept Gov’t-Appointed Lawyer Unless
Tortured,’ Arrested Chinese Lawyer Yu Wensheng Says, YOUTUBE (Apr. 26, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XD0VYOAPWoE (on file with the Washington
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).

152

25 WASH. & LEE L. J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 99 (2018)

detention without a trial.269 Wang’s wife is still advocating for
Wang’s release.270
Yu Wensheng was originally detained in 2014 for supporting
Hong Kong’s pro-democratic “Occupy Central” protest.271 He was
not formally charged with a crime in 2014.
Being an activist lawyer in China is not a safe activity. The
numbers of such lawyers appears to be growing and despite the
jailings and physical violence, they stayed determined in their
work.
What most impedes our work, though, is the revocation of our
licenses to practice law. China’s cities and provinces have
“lawyers’ associations” that appear to be modeled after the bar
associations of Western countries, and these groups decide
annually who is qualified to practice law. This is a good example
of where pretense and reality diverge in China’s legal world.
The lawyers’ associations are, in fact, puppets of the
government whenever a political question arises. Last year my
license to practice law was revoked.272

The battle has been joined between the die-hard lawyers and
the state. “These activist lawyers, who have wild intentions to
challenge and change the law, have deviated from what their jobs
are supposed to entail,” a state-oriented editorial said.273 The
269. See Gao Feng & Luisetta Mudie, Lawyer Withdraws from Wang
Quanzhang’s Case, Citing Injuries, ‘Fall’, RADIO FREE ASIA (Oct. 23, 2018),
https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/lawyer-10232018110436.html
(“A
Chinese attorney representing rights lawyer Wang Quanzhang, who has been
held incommunicado without trial since 2015, has withdrawn from the case, citing
injuries sustained in a ‘fall.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
270. See generally Joanna Chiu, Wife of ‘Vanished’ Chinese Lawyer Marches
for Answers, AFP NEWS (Apr. 05, 2018), http://sg.news.yahoo.com/wife-vanishedchinese-lawyer-marches-answers-114700248.html; Christian Shepherd, Wife of
Detained Chinese Lawyer Begins 100-km March to Press for Answers, REUTERS
(Apr. 04, 2018), https://reuters.com/article/us-china-rights/wife-of-detainedchinese-lawyer-begins-100-km-march-to-press-for-answers-idUSKCN1HB0J7
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see
also generally China Human Rights: Wife Marches for ‘Vanished’ Husband, BBC
NEWS (Apr. 04, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-43644599 (on
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
271. Changyi Xiuxian Beizhua, supra note 264.
272. See Teng, supra note 6.
273. Shan Renping, supra note 211.
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editorial leveled a warning at the group, who must “realize that
they are not commandos or the authoritative forces behind
improvements to rule of law in China.”274 Such challenges seem
only to further embolden the die-hards and their followers.
VI. Comparisons with the American Civil Rights Cause Lawyer
Beginning roughly seventy years ago, a new breed of lawyer
was born in the United States.275 These lawyers cared about the
“cause” as much or sometimes more than did their clients.276 These
lawyers viewed their role as more than that of a traditional lawyer
who represented, but was separate from, their clients.277 These
lawyers threatened well-guarded social orders,278 as did the
Chinese die-hards. They faced intense government and bar
association repression and reproach.279 Their work largely started
in the South, in the effort to press toward racial equality,280 and
spread to causes opposing the Vietnam War,281 discrimination
against women,282 mistreatment of the institutionalized, and
organization of workers, tenants and consumers283.

274.
275.

Id.
See generally KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE
CREATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER (Harv. Univ. Press 2012).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See generally James E. Moliterno, Politically Motivated Bar Discipline,
83 WASH. U. L. Q. 725 (2005) (describing how these new lawyers faced backlash).
280. See MACK, supra note 275, at 3–6 (describing the aim of civil rights
lawyers, such as Thurgood Marshall, and their efforts to evoke changes in
American race relations).
281. See generally Michal R. Belknap, The Warren Court and the Vietnam
War: The Limits of Legal Liberalism, 33 GA. L. REV. 65 (1998).
282. See Cary Franklin, The Meaning of the Civil Rights Revolution: Separate
Spheres, 123 YALE L.J. 2878, 2889 (2014) (identifying the women’s movement as
a derivative of the Civil Rights Movement).
283. See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor’s Identity Crisis, 89 CALIF. L.
REV. 1767, 1834 (2001) (identifying workers’ rights as a category to be included in
the civil rights discussion).
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Like their Die-Hard counterparts, these lawyers were
subjected to threats, depravations, violence, and near-death.284
The methods were different, to be sure. There was no RDSL, and
civil rights lawyers who were arrested were largely permitted
contact with their own lawyers and family.285 But at times, the
intensity of reaction to their threat to social order was no less than
the reaction has been to the die-hard lawyer. Consider a few
examples.
Following somewhat surprising success in defending Black
defendants following racial violence in 1946 Tennessee, Thurgood
Marshall was driving back to Nashville with three colleagues.286
On the road, their car was confronted by a car occupied by police287
and another occupied by local White citizens. The police stopped
Marshall’s car and insisted that they must search for illegal alcohol
or other contraband.288 None was present.289 Nonetheless, the
police placed Marshall in the backseat of their car between two
officers.290 They said he was to be returned to town to come before
284. See Sarah H. Brown, STANDING AGAINST DRAGONS: THREE SOUTHERN
LAWYERS IN AN ERA OF FEAR 236 (1998) (describing a white civil rights lawyer who
was evicted from his office building and chased with a shotgun due to his
involvement in civil rights cases and association with the Committee to Assist
Southern Lawyers).
285. See Kenneth T. Andrews, Lawyers and Embedded Legal Activity in the
Southern Civil Rights Movement, UNIV. OF DENVER L. & POL’Y (Dec. 07, 2017),
https://doi.org/10.1111/lapo.12096 (discussing the need for civil rights lawyers in
the South to have access to field offices for assistance when confronted with local
authorities).
286. See CHARLES L. ZELDEN, THURGOOD MARSHALL: RACE, RIGHTS, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR A MORE PERFECT UNION 40 (Paul Finkelman et al. eds., 2013) (“One
of Marshall’s closest brushes with death came in November 1946 in Maury
County, Tennessee . . . [when] Marshall was driving back to Nashville with two
other lawyers.”).
287. See id. (“Suddenly, three police cars stopped their car.”).
288. See JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY
131 (1998) (“[The police] announced they had a warrant to search for illegal
whiskey.”).
289. See ZELDEN, supra note 286, at 40 (“No alcohol was found and the three
lawyers drove off.”).
290. See Ron Cassie, Justice For All, BALTIMORE MAGAZINE,
https://www.baltimoremagazine.com/2017/8/7/justice-for-all-50-years-afterthurgood-marshall-supreme-court-confirmation (last visited Sept. 18, 2018)
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a judge on a drunk driving charge.291 Marshall had not been
drinking on that occasion.292 The police told his colleagues to
continue driving to Nashville.293
They began to drive, but had second thoughts and turned to
follow the police.294 Instead of proceeding into town, the police car
turned onto a dirt road that would end near a river.295 The
colleagues followed.296 The police car stopped near the river where
a lynch mob was waiting, surely meant for Marshall.297 When the
colleagues pulled in behind the police car, the police told them to
leave.298 They refused.299 In any event, even if they had turned and
left, unless the police were now willing to turn them all over to the
mob to be killed, the colleagues would be witnesses to the existence
of the lynch mob and the police collaboration with it.300 Instead of

(“Marshall . . . was soon separated from the two attorneys and the journalist
driving with him and ordered into the back seat of an unmarked vehicle.”) (on file
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
291. See ZELDEN, supra note 286, at 41 (“Finally, the police returned to town
and told Marshall to cross the street unaccompanied to the magistrate’s office.”).
292. See id. (describing Marshall’s interaction with the magistrate judge in
which he told the judge he was not drunk).
293. See id. (“Though the police told his companions to drive on down the road,
they bravely followed the police car with Marshall in it.”).
294. Id.
295. See Cassie, supra note 290 (“Marshall later recounted that he hadn’t
been scared until the car he was in turned from the unpaved road toward the
water . . . .”).
296. See id. (“Marshall was later saved only because fellow NAACP lawyer
Alexander Looby whipped a U-turn after seeing the car carrying Marshall—
supposedly headed to Columbia to face a judge with drunk driving—veer off the
main road.”).
297. See id. (“The mob got me one night . . . and they were taking me down to
the river where all of the white people were waiting to do a little bit of lynching.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
298. See ZELDEN, supra note 286, at 40 (“Though the police told his
companions to drive on down the road, they bravely followed the police car with
Marshall in it.”)
299. Id.
300. See Cassie, supra note 290 (“The mob got me one night . . . and they were
taking me down to the river where all of the white people were waiting to do a
little bit of lynching.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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leaving Marshall with the mob, presumably as planned, the police
drove back to the main road and into town where they presented
Marshall to the local judge.301 The judge declared that Marshall
had not been drinking and set him free from the police custody. 302
Marshall, later to litigate Brown v. Board, and still later to become
the first Black Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States,303 was as close to being murdered as he could be that day.
If not for the actions of his colleagues, the course of history and his
influence on it would have been dramatically altered.
One of Marshall’s colleagues that very day was Alexander
Looby,304 arguably the most successful civil rights lawyer in
Tennessee. He went on from that day with Marshall in 1946 to file
the first desegregation suit against the Nashville public schools.305
When the student sit-ins began in Nashville in 1960 he became
their first attorney, an action that resulted in violent response
against him.306 Fourteen years after Looby and his colleagues
probably saved Marshall’s life, on April 19, 1960, his house was
bombed and almost entirely demolished, as well as shattering
neighbors’ doors and windows.307 Fortunately, he and his wife were

301. See WILLIAMS, supra note 288, at 140 (“[The police] ordered Marshall out
of the car and told him to go to the judge’s chamber on the second floor of the
courthouse by himself.”)
302. See id. at 132 (“[Marshall] protested that he hadn’t had a drink in several
days.”)
303. See id. at 4–5 (identifying Marshall’s involvement in Brown v. Board of
Education and his appointment as the first African-American Supreme Court
Justice).
304. See Cassie, supra note 290 (“Marshall was later saved only because
fellow NAACP lawyer Alexander Looby whipped a U-turn after seeing the car
carrying Marshall . . . veer off the main road.”).
305. See Dorothy Granberry, Looby, Z. Alexander (1899–1972), THE BLACK
PAST: REMEMBERED AND RECLAIMED, http://www.blackpast.org/aah/looby-zalexander-1899-1972 (last visited Sept. 17, 2018) (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
306. Id.
307. Blast Wrecks Home of Nashville Negro Lawyer, OSHKOSH NORTHWESTERN
(Apr.
19,
1960),
https://www.newspapers.com/clip/
14347170/blast_wrecks_home_of_nashville_negro/ (on file with the Washington
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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asleep in a back room of the house and escaped the serious injuries
undoubtedly intended.308
Some five years later, a promising young lawyer who was
threating the social order in Charlotte, North Carolina, Julius
Chambers, also narrowly avoided violent death.309 Chambers had
filed the school desegregation claims on behalf of parents in
Mecklenberg County, North Carolina, in what would eventually
become the landmark case of Swann v. Mecklenberg County,
upholding the use of busing to desegregate schools.310 While
making a speech at a church not long after he had filed those
claims, his car was bombed.311 He and others went outside,
inspected the damage, and he returned to finish his speech.312
Undeterred, he filed more than 50 school desegregation complaints
and was also known for threatening the racial order attached to
perhaps an even more sacredly guarded activity: Football.313
Chambers had filed a claim on behalf of a record-setting Black high
school football player who could not be chosen for a local all-star
game because of his race.314
Marshall, Looby, and Chambers were not alone in being
violently terrorized by authorities and the locals with whom they
conspired.315 David Lipman had a rifle put his mouth for
308.
309.

Id.
See Jim Morrill, 50 Years Ago: Bombs Ignited Night of Terror, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER (Nov. 21, 2015), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politicsgovernment/article45744905.html (describing the targeted bombing of Julius
Chambers’ car) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights &
Social Justice).
310. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)
(holding that the busing of students is included in the scope of school authorities’
duties to eliminate racial segregation in public schools as mandated by the United
States Supreme Court).
311. Morrill, supra note 309.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Jim Morrill, 50 Years Ago: Bombs Ignited Night of Terror, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER (Nov. 21, 2015), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politicsgovernment/article45744905.html (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Social Justice).
315. See VOICES OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYERS 200–01 (Kent Spriggs ed., Univ.
Press of Fla., 2017).
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monitoring an election in Mississippi,316 others were punched or
beaten,317 and many jailed for “practicing law without a license,” a
crime that under normal circumstances would never produce
arrest and jail, particularly when the defendant was indeed a
lawyer in good standing in a state other than the arresting
venue.318
Especially in school desegregation cases, these new lawyers
drew the ire and reproach of traditional lawyers and the organized
bar. Following Brown, a strategy of fending off its mandate
emerged in the South, alternately called The Southern Manifesto
or Massive Resistance.319 The strategy was formulated by no less
than two United States Senators, one each from South Carolina
and Virginia.320 It was carried out by countless state and local
government officials.321 A central theme of this strategy was to
resist desegregation on the local level despite the Brown mandate,
forcing an almost county-by-county enforcement by desegregation
activists. The only path to the enforcement of Brown was for
NAACP and other activist lawyers to go to community gatherings
in small towns to discuss the possibilities for a local desegregation
law suit.322 Coming out from behind their desks to meet
prospective clients, these lawyers offended traditional
sensibilities, not to mention the politics and social preferences of
traditional lawyers, especially southern white lawyers.323 They
316.
317.
318.
319.

Id.
Id. at ch. 5.
Id.
See generally JOHN K. DAY, THE SOUTHERN MANIFESTO: MASSIVE
RESISTANCE AND THE FIGHT TO PRESERVE SEGREGATION (2014).
320. See id. at 63.
321. See Jared A. Goldstein, The Klan’s Constitution, 9 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L.
REV. 285, 344 (2018) (discussing the implementation of the Southern Manifesto
by Southern governors, legislators, mayors, and members of city councils and
school boards).
322. See Roy Wilkins, The Role of the NAACP, 2 SOCIAL PROBS. 201, 203 (1955)
(discussing the intention of the NAACP to make its legal services available to
parents of African American school children).
323. See Moliterno, supra note 279, at 739 (“Together, [civil rights lawyers]
collective fault in the eyes of the organized, traditional strength-center of the bar
was the disruption to the legal, social, and cultural status quo that their work
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were doing what their clients needed, they were pursuing a cause,
and they used means that were more aggressive and outside
common lawyer practice. The backlash was intense, with bar
associations and government authorities accusing these lawyers of
unethical conduct: solicitation of clients, stirring up litigation, and
the like, all in violation of newly-modified-to-the-task barratry and
champerty laws.324 Like today’s die-hard Chinese lawyers who are
using social media to reach outside the traditional
lawyer-advocacy-in-court mode,325 these lawyers were breaking
molds that produced negative, sometimes angry response from
government and their profession.
Harassment of Southern lawyers who represented civil rights
workers was fierce.326 A very few white Southern lawyers were
willing to represent civil rights workers in the deep South.327
Among the few who did, at least one was disbarred in
Mississippi.328 A Black lawyer representing school desegregation
plaintiffs in Mississippi was harassed by a federal district judge
regarding his professionalism, threatened with findings of
professional misconduct, and interrogated long enough to fill 118
pages of transcript.329 The harassment continued until the court of
appeals said that the district judge was creating “humiliation,
anxiety, and possible intimidation of a . . . reputable member of the
bar.”330 The claims against the lawyer were entirely baseless. “All
promised.”).
324. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 264–65 (1976) (“Few dared
to defend advocates of racial equality. Daring was costly: [I]t prompted
harassment by courts, legislatures, vigilantes, and fellow professionals . . . .”).
325. See Zhang, supra note 137.
326. See Moliterno supra note 279, at 742.
327. See id.
328. See AUERBACH, supra note 324, at 264–65; see also id. at 264 (describing
the disbarment of a Mississippi civil rights lawyer for his representation of a civil
rights advocate).
329. In re Brown, 346 F.2d 903, 905–08 (5th Cir. 1965) (suggesting that a civil
rights lawyer, whose professional conduct had never before been questioned, was
cited for contempt of court due to his engagement in litigation seeking
desegregation of certain Mississippi schools).
330. See id. (establishing that pages thirty-nine through 157 of the Court’s
record documented the harassment of a Mississippi civil rights lawyer by a federal

160

25 WASH. & LEE L. J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 99 (2018)

of the testimony taken in this matter . . . completely exonerates
Brown from any improper conduct.”331
Once Northern lawyers began to undertake representation
and organization of Southern civil rights clients and causes, new
forms of professional harassment emerged.
Among the lawyers whose work acted as a lightning rod for
organized bar criticism was William Kunstler.332 Kunstler’s
identification with his activist clientele broke sharply with
traditional lawyer norms of professional separation from clients
and earned him a folk hero status among law students and young
lawyers.333 Kunstler went from representing civil rights workers
including Mississippi Freedom Riders334 and other protesters in
the South, to Black Panthers,335 to the Chicago Seven.336 Kunstler
was not a large firm, New York lawyer who took up civil rights
causes.337 His early practice in the 1950s was characterized by
undistinguished representation in will, domestic relations, and
real estate closing matters, with one ironic exception: referred by
classmate Roy Cohn, Kunstler drafted a will for the
soon-to-be-infamous Joseph McCarthy.338

district court judge due to his engagement in litigation seeking desegregation of
certain Mississippi schools).
331. Id. at 909–10.
332. See Moliterno, supra note 279, at 744.
333. See Victor S. Navasky, Right On! With Lawyer William Kunstler, N.Y.
TIMES MAGAZINE, Apr. 21, 1970, at 30. (referring to Kunstler as a “radical lawyer
of the century”).
334. See Jerry Schwartz, ‘Chicago 7’ Attorney William Kunstler Still
Champion of the Political Underdog, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1987 (“Then, in 1961, the
ACLU asked [Kunstler] to go to Mississippi to assist local lawyers representing
the Congress of Racial Equality’s freedom riders.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
335. See Navasky, supra note 333.
336. See Schwartz, supra note 334 (“But to many, [Kunstler] is linked forever
with the Chicago 7 conspiracy trial . . . .”).
337. See DAVID J. LANGUM, WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER: THE MOST HATED LAWYER
IN AMERICA 44 (1999) (describing Kunstler’s early years of legal practice during
which he and his brother established Kunstler & Kunstler, “a rather ordinary
practice” on Fifth Avenue in New York City).
338. See id. at 44–45.
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As a traveling civil rights activist lawyer, Kunstler needed pro
hac vice admission in various courts to represent his clients, which
was not always freely given.339 Interestingly, Kuntsler regarded
himself as a modern-day, “itinerant lawyer in the colonial
tradition.”340 The image of Lincoln, riding circuit with his
colleagues from rotating court-day to court-day341 is not one that
traditional lawyers would have attached to Kunstler. And to be
sure, the political nature of their practices bears no comparison
whatever. But in another sense, the comparison to a 17th or 18th
century lawyer traveling from court to court to meet his clients and
represent them, is apt. The mode of transportation and its speed
and capacity had changed dramatically, but it was true that
Kunstler seemed to be everywhere, especially throughout the
South in the 1960s. Between the time of colonial lawyers and later
Lincoln’s circuit-riding and Kunstler’s traveling civil rights lawyer
show, UPL (unauthorized practice of law) restrictions on
cross-border law practice had become far more stringent.342
The Chicago Seven representation won him national attention
and, in some circles, derision.343 The circus nature of the Chicago
trial, and especially Kunstler’s openly hostile, two-way war with
Judge Julius Hoffman, produced four years’ worth of contempt
citations which were later reversed by the Seventh Circuit. 344 The
339. See Kunstler Upheld by Appeals Court, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 19, 1973,
at 34 (describing a district court’s refusal to admit Kunstler. Kunstler needed
permission to represent a client in prison for refusing induction, having been
transferred because of participation in a prison protest led by Rev. Daniel
Berrigan).
340. LANGUM, supra note 337 at 65.
341. See Willard L. King, Lincoln’s Manager: David Davis, U. OF CHI. L. SCH.
REC. 59 (Dec. 1960) (describing Abraham Lincoln and his manager, David Davis,
“riding the Eighth Illinois Circuit” in the 1940s and 1950s).
342. Compare Edward F. Sherman, The Right to Representation by
Out-of-State Attorneys in Civil Rights Cases, in ARTICLES BY MAUER FACULTY 65
(1968) (discussing the shift away from the lenient attitude of southern courts
towards out-of-state attorneys towards a more stringent outlook), with Pro Hac
Vice Admission Rules (ABA 2016) (providing the current requirements for pro hac
vice admission by state).
343. See Schwartz, supra note 334 (“But to many, [Kunstler] is linked forever
with the Chicago 7 conspiracy trial . . . .”).
344. See In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972) (reversing the district
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bar reaction to his ferocious representation in Chicago was
strikingly swift.345 The Association of the Bar of the City of New
York so anxiously awaited the opportunity to discipline Kunstler
that it began proceedings before the Chicago Seven trial had
ended, violating its own rules of procedure.346
In the end, confession came, as some elements within the
organized bar realized that repressive mistakes had been made,
especially in the context of efforts to chill zealous representation of
the so-called “new left.”347 The bar had “misconstrued . . . the
dimensions and causes of courtroom disorders . . . confus[ing] zeal
in the defense of clients with revolution . . . [in its movement to]
intimidate defense counsel.”348 Like the Die-Hard lawyer, Kunstler
challenged the government orthodoxy and he paid a price for it.
As they had to Kunstler, responding to outsiders with law
practice restrictions was a key measure for southern
lawyer-dominated legislatures.349 Five southern states enacted
harsher restrictions on client getting, unauthorized practice, and
community organizing activities, in an effort to prevent outside
lawyers (especially NAACP lawyers) from organizing and
recruiting plaintiffs for school desegregation cases that would force
compliance with Brown v. Board. The Virginia bar’s efforts to keep
outside lawyers outside resulted in the Supreme Court’s entry into
the fray in NAACP v. Button.350 The NAACP and its affiliate, the
court’s imposition of a four year, 13 thirteen-day sentence for contempt).
345. See Tom Goldstein, Bar Group Withdraws Charges Against Kunstler,
N.Y. TIMES Magazine 34 (Feb. 21, 1974) (discussing the grievance committee’s
departure from standard policy of “waiting until all appeals have been heard
before bringing disciplinary action”).
346. See id. (same).
347. Id.
348. NORMAN DORSEN & LEON FRIEDMAN, DISORDER IN THE COURT: REPORT OF
THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
COURTROOM DISORDER xiii–xvi (1973).
349. See Edward F. Sherman, The Right to Representation by Out-of-State
Attorneys in Civil Rights Cases, in ARTICLES BY MAUER FACULTY 65 (1968) (“[A]fter
the large demonstrations and mass arrest subsided and civil rights law practice
in the South shifted from defense to affirmative suits, the lenient attitude of
southern courts towards out-of-state attorneys began to change.”).
350. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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Legal Defense Fund (LDF) had chapters in Virginia.351 Through
these chapters, Virginia residents were informed of the possibility
of pursuing school desegregation suits by retaining NAACP and
LDF lawyers.352 Lawyers affiliated with the NAACP were paid a
per diem during such representation, but often without any other
form of compensation.353 The Virginia State Bar proceeded against
these lawyers and the NAACP on the ground that their conduct
amounted to inappropriate solicitation of business and, in
particular, that the NAACP, which was not a party to the various
school desegregation litigation, had unlawfully interjected itself
into litigated matters by soliciting plaintiffs and supplying
lawyers.354 The Virginia courts held that the NAACP lawyers had
acted unethically.355 The Virginia courts asserted that the statutes’
purpose was to uphold high standards of the legal profession by
“strengthen[ing] the existing statutes to further control the evils of
solicitation of legal . . . [s]olicitation of legal business has been
considered and declared from the very beginning of the legal
profession to be unethical and unprofessional conduct.”356
Eliminating the activities of the NAACP at that juncture would
likely have spelled an end to school desegregation in Virginia for
the foreseeable future. The Supreme Court reversed the Virginia
courts’ treatment of the issue, holding that such an application of
the solicitation rules violated expression and association rights
under the First and Fourteenth amendments.357
351. See id. at 421 (discussing the involvement of Defense Fund lawyers in
litigation in Virginia).
352. Id.
353. See id. at 420–21 (describing the payment of Defense Fund lawyers by
the Virginia Conference as “a per diem fee not to exceed [sixty dollars], plus
out-of-pocket expenses”).
354. See id. at 419 (analyzing whether solicitation of clients by the Defense
Fund and the NAACP was unethical and in violation of Chapter 33 of the Virginia
Code).
355. See NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 155, 116 S.E.2d 55, 66 (1960)
(holding that the actions of the NAACP constituted "fomenting and soliciting legal
business in which they are not parties and have no pecuniary right or liability”).
356. Id. at 154.
357. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963) (“We conclude that
although the petitioner has amply shown that its activities fall within the First
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Both federal courts and the executive branch in some ways
protected the civil rights lawyer from mistreatment at the hands
of state and local officials. In this respect, the Chinese Die-Hard
lawyer is markedly different.
David Mays was an example of a moderate segregationist
lawyer, whose views of civil rights lawyers would today be
regarded as extreme.358 Mays was congratulated and thanked
repeatedly for his Gray Commission role at a 1955 Virginia State
Bar meeting, the same meeting at which the organization adopted
a resolution condemning the Supreme Court for its invasion of
states’ rights in Brown.359
Mays, the moderate who was praised by his fellow lawyers for
stabilizing the radical segregationists,360 referred to W. Hale
Thompson of
Newport
News
as
that
“unbelievably
arrogant . . . nigger lawyer.”361 Thompson had dared to suggest in
a Gray Commission public hearing that “Thomas Jefferson, James
Madison and Patrick Henry would be ashamed of some members
of the [Virginia] General Assembly.”362
When Mays described the pleasure of having two former FBI
men play surreptitiously-made recordings of NAACP lawyer
conversations with plaintiffs in the Prince Edward County case
and the Charlottesville case, he made no mention of whether he
Amendment’s protections, the State has failed to advance any substantial
regulatory interest . . . which can justify the broad prohibitions which it has
imposed.”). Other “association” cases followed, arising largely from a new ethos of
cause or issue lawyering that accompanied the first federally funded legal aid
programs.
358. See DAVID J. MAYS, RACE, REASON, AND MASSIVE RESISTANCE 2 (James R.
Sweeney ed., 2008) (“A product of white society in the early-twentieth-century
South, [Mays] retained the attitudes of that time, although his temperament and
his legal training prevented him from taking extreme positions.”)
359. See id. at 62 (discussing the praise that Mays’ peers gave him pertaining
to his views on segregation and with the Gray Commission of 1954).
360. See id. (“Many lawyers have made it clear to me that they look upon me
as the stabilizing influence that has prevented a stacked commission from taking
radical action” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
361. See id. at 85–86 (suggesting that Mays was referring to W. Hale
Thompson when he referred to a speaker at a Gray Commission public hearing as
“one nigger lawyer [who] was unbelievably arrogant.”).
362. Id.
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was listening to an intrusion on the lawyer-client relationship.363
Instead he said, “These may prove very helpful in probable
proceedings by the [Virginia State Bar] against Oliver Hill [a
preeminent school desegregation lawyer] and possibly others.” No
evidence appears to exist that Hill was ever charged, but his
colleague Samuel Tucker was repeatedly brought before bar
authorities and charged with misconduct.364 Mays openly favored
the bills introduced by Charles Fenwick and Harrison Mann,
which he thought was meant to “harass the NAACP.”365
In correspondence with Sidney Carleton, a former President of
the Mississippi State Bar, ABA President Lewis Powell, long
regarded as a voice of moderation in the profession and later on the
Supreme Court, registered his views on Northern lawyers who
represented Southern Blacks. Carleton, in an angry response to
National Lawyers Guild (NLG) representation in Mississippi, said:
[T]here has never been a time when the lawyers of the state of
Mississippi have not stood ready, willing, and able to represent
those in need of legal representation. It has not, however, been
the policy of either the Mississippi State Bar nor of its members
to violate public policy or to engage in the unethical practices or
to become accessories before the fact by agreeing in advance to
represent persons in criminal proceedings arising from
contemplated actions not then having occurred.366

Powell replied to Carleton with praise for the Mississippi Bar, in
language that implies negative views of NAACP and NLG lawyers
who had organized the school desegregation plaintiffs such as
those at issue in Button:
363. See id. at 191 (describing two former FBI agents playing recordings of
conversations with plaintiffs in the Prince Edward County and Charlottesville
NCAAP cases).
364. See id. at 191; see also interview with Senator Harry L. Marsh III,
http://www.library.vcu.edu/jbc/speccoll/civilrights/marsh01.html (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); S.J. Ackerman, The
Trials of S.W. Tucker, WASH. POST, June 11, 2000, at W14.
365. MAYS, supra note 358, at 158.
366. Letter from C. Sidney Carlton, Partner, Carleton & Henderson, to Ernest
Goodman, President, National Lawyers Guild (Aug. 6, 1964) (on file in Lewis F.
Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law Library,
General Correspondence during Presidency, Box 76).
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My own view is that your bar took a fine step in its recent
resolution on this subject. I think all of the southern bars should
do the same thing, and follow them up with actual
representation of Negroes—not to foment litigation but to
defend those accused of crime. This is the best way I know to
keep northerners from ‘invading’ the southern states. I am
afraid nothing can keep some of the radicals from defaming the
South generally without the slightest recognition that
lawlessness in the northern cities is on a larger scale.367

Powell’s and Carleton’s remarks echo the resistance of the
Chinese authority to the undermining ideas and interference of
foreigners. Western interference and dangerous influence,
including an ABA Human Rights award issued to Wang Yu,
threaten the Chinese authority. For Southern lawyer-leaders, the
foreign influence to be resisted came from the “invasion” of
Northern lawyers and organizations.
Meanwhile, labor unions endeavored to provide counsel to
their members, and federally-funded legal aid lawyers organized
tenants and farm workers and represented entire classes of
welfare recipients, institutional inmates and others. Still other
lawyers sought to represent middle class clients at lower cost,
using office automation and high client-volume generated by
bar-prohibited advertising.
In every instance the profession objected. In part, to be sure,
the objections were motivated by opposition to the causes advanced
by the new style of lawyer, but the objections were also to the new
style of lawyering itself. To the traditional, one-client-at-a-time
lawyer, whose clients found the lawyer through word of mouth in
clubs and churches and social organizations rather than through
advertising, this aggressive new style of lawyering was
unprofessional, distasteful and demeaning to the profession
generally. For these traditional lawyers, who not coincidentally
represented corporate interests, cause lawyering was not proper
lawyering at all, and it had to be stopped. Cause lawyers identified
not exclusively with the private interests of clients, but to a great
degree with the cause missions of the lawyers themselves. Cause
lawyers pursued reform or closure of substandard prisons, jails
and mental health facilities; they organized tenants, farm workers,
and public assistance recipients; they identified specific laws and
367.

Id.
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worked toward their reform. Like the Chinese die-hard lawyer
whose goal is to reform the criminal justice system or the human
rights policies of the state, the client was in some ways a vehicle
for the reform work of the lawyer. And for both, traditional lawyers
and the state itself objected vociferously.
The profession’s impression of this new form of lawyering was
accurate. Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach called for
“new techniques, new services, and new forms of intra-professional
cooperation to . . . analyze the rights of welfare recipients, of
installment purchasers, of people affected by slum housing, crime
and despair.”368 “There are signs, too,” he noted, “that a new breed
of lawyers is emerging, dedicated to using the law as an
instrument of orderly and constructive social change.”369 Charles
Hamilton Houston viewed the mission of the Howard Law School,
to which he brought respectability and accreditation, as the
creation of “social engineers” capable of making real the teachings
of sociological jurisprudence that emerged during the first half of
the twentieth century.370 It was to be a cause-lawyer school.
Neither Katzenbach’s nor Houston’s vision of lawyering meshed
with the profession’s status-quo, and it met resistance from the
organized bar as a result. Lawyers who were as fully committed to
their clients’ cause as were their clients threatened to disrupt the
classical image of lawyers as being entirely independent and
separate from their clients’ goals.371
In China, many of the detained human rights advocates and
their lawyers were champions of the peaceful transition theory,
under which advocates believed that the moves toward market
economy in China would pave the way for non-violent reform of the
political system and elimination of the CCP’s strangle-hold on
368. Id. at ch. 5.
369. History of Civil Legal Aid, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N,
http://www.nlada.org/About/About_HistoryCivil (last visited Aug. 14, 2018) (on
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
370. See Susan D. Carle, From Buchanan to Button: Legal Ethics and the
NAACP (Part II), 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 281, 295–96 (2001) (citing Genna
Rae McNeil, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS 84 (Univ. of Pa. Press 1983)) (using the term “social engineers” to
describe the “new generation of mostly American civil rights lawyers” who would
use the law as the means to attain the goal of improved social policy).
371. See generally GAO ZHISHENG, supra note 195.
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power.372 This theory invoked fear among CCP leadership, likening
it to the color revolutions and the Arab Spring uprisings. The CCP
reaction compares with the fears of US corporate and political
power structures that cause lawyers’ empowerment of workers,
tenants, and the poor were essentially subversive of the status quo.
Fierce criticism of poverty lawyers and civil rights activist
lawyers came from the highest levels of judicial, government and
bar leadership. Ronald Reagan was “openly hostile to legal services
lawyers,” first as Governor of California and later as President of
the United States.373 Warren Burger, in his pleas for civility,374
gave substantial blame for the impending downfall of the
profession to lawyers in political trials, or as Burger called them,
the “new litigation.”375 He encouraged the legal profession to apply
“rigorous powers of discipline” to the misbehaving lawyers by
either the judicial or bar enforcement systems.376 Failure to do so,
he warned, would allow “the jungle [to] clos[e] in on us.”377 Bar
leaders and commentators followed the Chief Justice’s lead.378
As ABA President, Powell was a vocal condemnor of civil
disobedience, repeatedly decrying the actions of sit-in

372. See generally id.
373. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 7, 29–33.
374. See Burger Speaks and Kunstler ‘Counters’, N.Y. TIMES 25 (Sept. 18,
1971) (noting that at the dedication of the Georgetown Law School building in
1971, a most striking contrast was framed by Chief Justice Burger’s dedication
speech and William Kunstler’s “counterdedication” speech—Kunstler and others
delivered their student-organized counterdedication speeches from the bed of a
pick-up truck parked outside the building).
375. Fred P. Graham, Burger Assails Unruly Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES 1 (May 19,
1971) (quoting and excerpting from Chief Justice Burger’s speech).
376. Id. (quoting and excerpting from Chief Justice Burger’s speech).
377. Id. (quoting and excerpting from Chief Justice Burger’s speech).
378. See William A. Stanmeyer, The New Left and the Old Law, 55 A.B.A. J.
319 (1969) (echoing Powell’s address before the American Association of State
Colleges and Universities in 1968). See generally DORSEN & FRIEDMAN, supra note
348; see also generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION
OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, PROBLEMS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT xvii (1970); William A. 319
(1969).
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demonstrators’ and Freedom Riders’ testing of discriminatory laws
regulating racial treatment in the South.379
We have witnessed, over the past decade, the development of a
heresy that could threaten the foundations of our system of
government under law. This is the doctrine that each person
may determine for himself what laws are “just,” and that laws
and court orders are to be obeyed only so long as this seems ‘just’
to the individuals or groups concerned . . . . In 1965 many
people believed that civil disobedience of orders and laws
deemed to be unjust is a legitimate means of asserting rights
and attaining objectives. Indeed, it is not too much to say that
this form of civil disobedience—and its own unique tactics of
demonstrations, sit-ins, lie-downs and mob pressure—has
become the principal weapon of certain minority and dissident
groups . . . . But our Constitution and tradition contemplate the
orderly assertion of these rights. 380

He did not mention states and state bar associations that were
resisting the Brown mandate, ostensibly because they were of the
view that it was unjust.
Professional opposition and harassment of legal aid lawyers
proceeded in part on the ground that state bars and powerful
institutional interests saw their economic and political interests
threatened by the lawsuits and legislative lobbying being done by
cause lawyers on behalf of their clients.381
State and local bar associations in California, Texas, Florida,
Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C. unsuccessfully sued the Office
of Economic Opportunity (OEO), claiming it was violating ethical
canons.382 They claimed that legal services lawyers were engaged
379. See, e.g., Lewis F. Powell, Jr., President, Am. Bar Ass’n, The President’s
Annual Address: The State of Legal Profession, Address at the Assembly of the
American Bar Association (Aug. 9, 1965), in 51 A.B.A. J. 821, 827 (1965) (calling
civil disobedience “a dangerous trend”); see also, e.g., JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR.,
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 210–11 (Charles Scribner’s Sons, NY, 1994).
380. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 1–3.
381. See Harry P. Stumpf, Law and Poverty: A Political Perspective, 3 WIS. L.
REV. 694, 708–09 (1968) (“Opposition to federally funded legal services has been
voiced on economic, professional, and ideological grounds. To the marginal (often
solo) private practitioner, legal services may represent a threat to his livelihood.
To the well-established lawyer the program is often seen as socialistic and
unnecessary.”).
382. See EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF
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in unauthorized practice and were unlawfully soliciting clients.383
In doing so, they were largely reacting to the new, aggressive style
of lawyering. These lawyers did not wait in their offices for clients
to come; instead they sought clients to pursue the lawyers’ causes.
These lawyers did not pursue ordinary contract, commercial, tort
and property claims. Instead, they sought social reform. They
worked toward closing inhumane prisons and mental institutions,
they organized tenants and farm workers, they worked to reform
public assistance laws, and establish enhanced rights for criminal
defendants. All of this drew the ire of the established power
structures, both corporate and legal. In this way, US civil rights
lawyers do resemble Chinese die-hard and human rights lawyers:
both groups broke ranks with the traditional lawyering methods
and practices of their predecessors.
Perhaps the most vociferous fight between legal aid lawyers
and a coalition of business and government interests was spawned
by the California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA) organization and
representation of farm workers.384 CRLA moved in a variety of
ways to increase wages for farm workers and demand government
services for them.385 These lawsuits drew the ire and outrage of
then Governor Ronald Reagan and Senator George Murphy,
speaking and acting on behalf of the California agribusiness
THE OEO LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM

91 (Russell Sage Found. 1978) (summarizing
various conflict-producing combinations of political and bar interests); see also
Troutman v. 1969); AUERBACH, supra note 324, at 273; Billie Bethel & Robert Kirk
Walker, Et Tu, Brute!, 1965 TENN. S.B.A.J. 11 (1965), quoted in A. Kenneth Pye
& Raymond F. Garraty, Jr., The Involvement of the Bar in the War Against
Poverty, 41 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 860, 866–69 (1966) (quoting “Et Tu, Brute!”
depicting the OEO Legal Services Program as affecting “the destruction of the
free, vital and independent protector of human rights—the creator of the
system—the legal profession”). See generally Troutman v. Shriver, 417 F.2d 171
(5th Cir. 1969).
383. See JOHNSON, supra note 382.
384. See HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 7, at 15–16 (describing the CRLA as
a “particularly aggressive legal services program that had gained notoriety for its
successful efforts to stop certain draconian welfare and Medicaid policies in
California and for its advocacy on behalf of farmworkers against agricultural
employers”).
385. See id. (“The anti-CRLA testimony came from the California Farm
Bureau, an organization of agricultural employers, which was frequently at odds
with the CRLA and the farmworkers it represented.”).
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industry.386 At the time, state governors had the power to veto
funding for their state’s federally funded legal aid programs, but
that veto could be over-ridden by the OEO Director.387 Only once
was a California governor’s veto sustained: In 1970, Governor
Ronald Reagan vetoed the funding and the veto was sustained by
then-OEO Director Donald Rumsfeld.388 Unsuccessful efforts by
Murphy would have placed full control of legal services programs
in the hands of governors, localizing control to suppress locally
unpopular legal aid activities, and would have prohibited legal aid
suits against the government.389 The latter effort was a part of a
national affront to the successes of legal aid lawyers in various
government-defendant matters, especially in the arena of welfare
reform.390
In some instances, courts refused to certify legal aid
organizations whose community organizing went beyond
traditional law service bounds.391 A New York Appellate Division
objected to certifying more than one legal services provider for a
particular county, for fear of their “unseemly[] competition” for
representation of non-paying clients, and out of worry that the

386. AUERBACH, supra note 324, at 274–75; Fred J. Hiestand, The Politics of
Poverty Law, in WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: AN INDICTMENT OF THE LAW 160, 160–89
(Bruce Wasserstein & Mark J. Green eds., 1970); see John D. Robb, Controversial
Cases and the Legal Services Program, 56 A.B.A.J. 329, 329 (1970); see also
AUERBACH, supra note 328, at 274–75 (noting that Senator Murphy’s remarks
indicated the intent to prevent legal services programs from bringing cases
against governmental agencies and officials and from engaging in test cases).
387. See HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 7, at 4.
388. See Hiestand, supra note 386, at 182.
389. See Robb, supra note 386, at 329–30 (noting that the Senate did not pass
a 1967 version of the Murphy amendment that would have precluded suits
against government agencies, and that the 1969 version was “a reaction at the
national level that surfaced in a number of communities”).
390. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 (1968) (concluding that
Alabama breached its federally imposed obligation to furnish federal assistance
to families with dependent children by preventing otherwise eligible children
from aid if the mother cohabits with a man not obligated to support the children);
see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637–42 (1969) (deciding that
statutory prohibitions of welfare benefits to residents of less than a year is
unconstitutional).
391. See, e.g., In re Cmty. Action for Legal Servs., Inc., 274 N.Y.S.2d 779, 786
(App. Div. 1966).
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court could not maintain minimum standards of conduct.392 The
court also expressed concern about the applicants’ mixing of
community action goals and legal service.393
Along with labor union lawyers, federally funded legal aid
lawyers were a significant part of the new style of lawyering, cause
or group lawyering, that did not go unchallenged by the organized
bar and, acting through the bar, powerful economic interests. The
standard one-client- at-a-time model of lawyering did not suit the
goals of legal aid lawyers and union lawyers. Their strength lay in
collective action that allowed a marshaling of modest resources in
pursuit of a cause. The standard bar obstruction first took the form
of unauthorized practice restrictions and later advertising and
solicitation rules.
Having failed in its efforts to restrict the activities of school
desegregation lawyers,394 the Virginia State Bar worked to stifle
opportunities for labor unions to provide counsel to their
members.395 And the Illinois Bar initially prevented the United
Mine Workers from hiring inside, house counsel.396 Each of these
efforts was rejected by a Supreme Court whose decisions fostered
the accumulation of power through collective legal action.
“Collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the
courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First
Amendment.”397 The Court’s rejection of the bar’s insistence on the
traditional one lawyer-one client notion of lawyering laid the legal
392. See id. (expressing concern over the court and agencies being able to
effectively supervise multiple legal assistance corporations in one area).
393. See id. (expressing concern over the court and agencies being able to
effectively supervise multiple legal assistance corporations in one area).
394. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428–29 (1963) (holding that the
activities of the NAACP and its legal staff are “modes of expression and
association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments which Virginia
may not prohibit . . . as improper solicitation of legal business . . . .”).
395. See Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (holding that
the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the rights of labor organization
members “to maintain and carry out their plan for advising workers who are
injured to obtain legal advice and for recommending specific lawyers”).
396. See UMW v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 218 (1967) (noting that
the Bar had claimed that when UMW hired inside, house counsel, this
employment amounted to the unauthorized practice of law).
397. United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971).
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groundwork for legal aid lawyers’ representation of causes, groups,
and social issues, rather than individual clients. This sort of
representation presented the shocking circumstance for powerful
economic interests and government agencies, not used to having to
deal with poor people on so nearly an equal footing. As the lawyer
in charge of OEO programs in California put it, “What we have
created in CRLA [California Rural Legal Assistance] is an
economic leverage equal to that of large corporations. Clearly that
should not be.”398 The mere concept of such power residing in poor
people and their lawyers seemed foreign, dangerous and
subversive to the legal profession.
Lawyers representing causes could not simply wait in their
offices for the causes to arrive in the personage of an eligible client.
While Attorney General, Nicholas Katzenbach tried to deter bar
application of advertising and solicitation restrictions against
poverty lawyers when he announced that lawyers should “go out to
the poor rather than wait . . . to be reduced to inaction by ethical
prohibitions is to let the canons . . . serve the cause of injustice.”399
Katzenbach was an officer of the federal executive branch, which
along with the federal courts, supported the cause lawyer.400 The
Chinese Die-Hard lawyer has no such champion in the Chinese
state apparatus.
An uneasy measure of conditional cooperation regarding
federally-funded legal aid eventually emerged from the organized
bar at the national level.401 Even as the ABA began to co-operate
398. AUERBACH, supra note 324, at 274.
399. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at
the National Conference on Law and Poverty 3 (June 24, 1965).
400. See Michal R. Belknap, Civil Rights During the Kennedy Administration,
23 Law & Soc’y Rev. 921, 921 (1989) (stating that the Kennedy administration
laid the ground work for the Johnson administrations ultimate passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965); see also Steven J.
Simmons, Earl Warren, the Warren Court and Civil Liberties, 2 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 3
(1975) (stating that protection of civil liberties, particularly for African Americans
was a common thread of the Warren Court).
401. See HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 7 (discussing that in later years and
controversies, the ABA grew to be almost unerringly supportive of legal services
programs, fighting against, for example, President Reagan’s proposal to zero-fund
the Legal Services Corporation in 1980.); see also id. at 30 (“[B]eginning in the
early 1980s, a significant effort was made by the ABA and LSC to involve private
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with federally funded legal services, its best and most able
spokespersons continued to put an unduly positive face on the
organization’s prior record of opposing meaningful legal services
for the poor. William McCalpin, who was truly instrumental in
shaping the ABA’s more enlightened position on legal services,
prefaced his strong advocacy for support of legal services by
imagining an ABA previously unaware of the legal needs of the
poor: “[R]ecently we have begun to be aware of the possible legal
needs of 40,000,000 disadvantaged citizens . . . .”402 The prior
month’s issue of the same ABA Journal featured an article by
Marvin Frankel that began with a statement more reflective of
reality outside the walls erected by the ABA: “It is no new discovery
that the promise of equal justice is a hollow one for people too poor
to retain counsel.”403
The ABA supported the new federal legal services program,
provided that those services were “performed by lawyers in
accordance with ethical standards of the legal profession.”404 Legal
aid lawyers, like any lawyers in other fields, were expected to
comply with normal ethical rules. However, courts had not yet
reformed the rules regarding solicitation,405 and consequently legal
attorneys in the delivery of civil legal services. While the organized bar was
generally supportive of LSC, certain segments of the legal profession remained
unfamiliar with legal services practice, felt threatened by legal services advocacy,
and, in some instances, were hostile to LSC’s mission.”).
402. F. William McCalpin, The Bar Faces Forward, 51 A.B.A.J. 548, 550
(1965).
403. Marvin E. Frankel, Experiments in Serving the Indigent, 51 A.B.A.J. 460,
460 (1965) (hoping against some of the early evidence that the ABA would allow
new, OEO funded legal services offices to be established rather than merely
pressing for additional funding for the traditional legal aids under the supervision
of NLADA); interview by Olavi Maru with F. William McCalpin, Aug. 22, 1975,
http://www.abf-sociolegal.org/oralhistory/mccalpin.html, Tape MCA-1-B (noting
that ironically, some years later in an oral history of his ABA involvement,
McCalpin himself described the unfortunate, introspection practiced by the ABA
in dealing with difficult issues) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Social Justice).
404. McCalpin, supra note 402, at 551 (quoting Richard Pious, Congress, the
Organized Bar, and the Legal Services Program, 1972 WIS. L. REV. 418, 420–21
(1972)) (discussing the political background for the ABA House of Delegates
Resolution).
405. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 423–25 (1978) (stating that the
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aid and cause lawyers engaged in community organizing were
subject to continued harassment by bar authorities for direct
solicitation of clients.406
VII. Concluding Thoughts
Fifty to seventy years later, some wounds of the war on civil
rights lawyers remain, but such lawyering is no longer so far
outside the mainstream. Although this reality continues to distress
some with long memories of what they consider more civil times,
there is no doubt that the more aggressive style of lawyering
created by the cause lawyers of the 1960s and 1970s is a part of
today’s American legal profession.
How will Chinese lawyering look in fifty to seventy years? No
one can be sure. Nonetheless, the reaction to the July 2015
round-up and detention of rights lawyers offers some clues and
some parallels with the experience of American civil rights
lawyers.
This round-up and detention significantly increased the
tension between the state and the activist lawyers, and so far,
despite serious risk to themselves, the lawyers are not backing
down.407 Despite being warned against continued aggressive
activity, current trends indicate that the state pressure appears to
be having the opposite effect, with more lawyers answering the call
solicitation of clients by non-profit organizations, such as the NAACP, for political
and associational purposes enjoyed broad First Amendment protections, which
could only be regulated with narrow specificity); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT 7.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (proposing a rule regarding lawyer’s ability to
solicit clients).
406. See James Moliterno, Politically Motivated Bar Discipline, 83 WASH. U.
L.Q. 725, 742–45 (2005) (detailing Southern state bar efforts to deter civil rights
litigation).
407. See Andrew Jacobs and Chris Buckley, China Targeting Rights Lawyers
in
a
Crackdown,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
22,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/world/asia/china-crackdown-human-rightslawyers.html (“Despite the intense police pressure, and the previous
imprisonment of lawyers . . . dozens have organized petitions denouncing the
detentions and volunteered to defend those held by the police.”) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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of staunch criminal defense and human rights lawyering.408
Despite the intense and politically repressive environment, more
lawyers are joining the ranks of the die-hard segment.409
Yu Wengsheng, a commercial lawyer in Hong Kong, is typical
of these newly minted activists. When Yu’s client was arrested for
involvement in the annual Hong Kong turn-back day protests—
demanding more self-government and democratic selection
processes in Hong Kong—Yu attempted to visit his client in
detention.410 Yu felt outraged when he was prohibited from seeing
his client, given his long background of ordinary commercial work
and the absence of any previous criminal defense or activist
work.411 Yu organized his own protests outside the jail on behalf of
his client, and was promptly arrested himself.412 Now, Yu says, “I
used to think being a lawyer was just a tool to make money . . . .
But now I believe we have a greater mission to change a broken
system. The crackdown is fierce, but we rights lawyers will fight
back.”413
Indeed, as Yu said, “the crackdown is fierce.”414 “This mass
crackdown on lawyers is the broadest in terms of location, and
clearly coordinated because of the timing of the initial crackdown,”
said Sharon Hom, executive director of Human Rights in China.415
408. See Abby Seiff, China’s Latest Crackdown on Lawyers is Unprecedented,
Human Rights Monitors Say, A.B.A.J. (Feb. 1, 2016, 12:10 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/chinas_latest_crackdown_on_lawye
rs_is_unprecedented_human_rights_monitors/news/article/do_you_volunteer_on
_a_regular_basis/?utm_campaign=sidebar (“[t]here was a broad expectation that
it would have a very, very bad chilling effect . . . [w]hat happened was the
movement grew. More and more lawyers were joining these groups . . . holding
meetings . . . and taking on cases together with more experienced human rights
lawyers.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
409. See id. (“A decade ago, there were a few dozen rights lawyers there.
Today, there are hundreds.”).
410. Jacobs & Buckley, supra note 407.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Seiff, supra note 408.
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“It included more than 23 provinces. It was a combination of
detentions, disappearances and targeting family members,
together with a very clear propaganda smear campaign in
the People’s Daily. This is clearly a mass attack on lawyers that’s
misusing legal process, using propaganda and then bringing back
the collective punishment of China’s past by targeting the
families.”416
The attack consists not only of the 2015 round-up of more than
200 lawyers, law firm staff, human rights activists, and family
members, two of whom probably remain in detention in 2018,417
but of a state media blitz smearing the detained lawyers.418 State
media outlets such as Xinhua and others have painted the rights
lawyers in terms reminiscent of the complaints about the conduct
of American civil rights lawyers.419 The state media reports the
416.
417.

Id.
“709 Crackdown” Latest Data and Development of Cases as of 1800,
CHINA
HUM.
RTS.
L.
CONCERN
GROUP
(July
7,
2018),
http://www.chrlawyers.hk/en/content/%E3%80%90%E2%80%9C709-crackdown
%E2%80%9D%E3%80%91-latest-data-and-development-cases-1800-7-july-2018
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
418. Anthony Kuhn, Chinese Authorities Detain Nearly 150 Human Rights
Lawyers,
NPR,
(July
14,
2015),
http://www.npr.org/2015/07/14/422952236/chinese-authorites-detain-nearly-150human-rights-lawyers (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights
& Social Justice); Chun Han Wong, Human-Rights Lawyers Detained in China
Confess, State Media Reports, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/human-rights-lawyers-detained-in-china-confessstate-media-reports-1437307686 (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Social Justice); Andrew Jacobs & Chris Buckley, China Targeting
Rights Lawyers in a Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/world/asia/china-crackdown-human-rightslawyers.html (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice); China Cracks Down on Lawyers and Activists, ALJAZEERA (July 19,
2015),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/china-crackdown-lawyersactivists- 150719112829794.html (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Social Justice).
419. See Detained Chinese Lawyers Admit Guilt in Disorder Charges: State
Media, REUTERS (July 24, 2015), https://www.businessinsider.com/r-detainedchinese-lawyers-admit-guilt-in-disorder-charges-state-media-2015-7
(“The
People’s Daily accused the group connected with the Fengrui firm of orchestrating
protests outside courts to help secure favorable verdicts for clients . . . . The
Xinhua state news agency, in a separate report on Sunday, described such
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accusations against the lawyers as “stirring up” trouble,420 and of
supporting protests on behalf of the lawyers’ clients, echoing
Southern states use of a barratry and champerty statutes to deter
American civil rights lawyer from stirring up litigation, and of
participating in civil rights protests to aid their clients.421 The
Chinese lawyers stand accused of “seriously interfering with
normal judicial activities and disrupting social order.”422 The
likeness to the accusations against US civil rights lawyers is
striking.
A further sign that Chinese authorities may actually be
creating more cause lawyers rather than deterring them is a
petition movement begun by a group of prominent lawyers in
response to a 2015 crackdown that led to the detention of 200
lawyers and activists.423 The petition denounces the “intimidating
harassment” of authorities against lawyers.424 The petition calls on
the Chinese government to “respect the constitutional rights” of
the detained lawyers, as well as an end to the raids on law offices
and a fair and transparent judicial process for the detained
lawyers.425 The petition, which was signed by over 1,000 people,
states that “[o]nly when lawyers’ professional duty and rights are
respected can the rule of law as understood in the civilised world
take root in Mainland China,”426 Within China, only in Hong Kong
could such a petition drive take root and grow. But for all of the
economic benefits that have inured to China from the return of
behavior as ‘very close to blackmailing.’”) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
420. Id.
421. See Wayne Rhine, Barratry—A Comparative Analysis of Recent Barratry
Statutes, 14 DEPAUL L. REV. 146, 147 (1964 (describing Southern states efforts to
strengthen their barratry statutes as a legal weapon against civil right litigation).
422. Detained Chinese Lawyers Admit Guilt in Disorder Charges: State
Media, supra note 419.
423. See China Cracks Down on Lawyers and Activists, ALJAZEERA (July 19,
2015),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/china-crackdown-lawyersactivists-150719112829794.html (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Social Justice).
424. See id.
425. Id.
426. Id.
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Hong Kong, the social upheaval wrought by the island’s
long-British-ruled inhabitants may cost the Party dearly.
The American social upheaval of the 1960s, topped off by
Watergate in the early 1970s, produces a generation of lawyers
who were far more devoted to social justice than their
predecessors.427 Along with Ford Foundation funding,428 the
greatest impetus for the development of law school clinical
programs focused on social justice was student demand.429 The
clinical legal education movement has begun in China during the
last decade, and appears connected with heightened levels of
student interest in social justice.430 Like their American cause
lawyer counterparts of fifty to seventy years ago, the new breed of
die-hard lawyer may be marking a way forward for their legal
profession.

427. See Laura G. Holland, Invading the Ivory Tower: The History of Clinical
Legal Education at Yale Law School, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 504, 514 (1999) (“The
social and political movements of the 1960s called lawyers to become activist
reformers. Law students heard the same call and sought out work that would
make their theoretical study of law relevant to the social struggle that was going
on outside the walls of the law school.”).
428. See Stephen Wizner, The Law School Clinic: Legal Education in the
Interests of Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1929, 1933 (2002) (“But it was not until
the late 1960s that clinical legal education received financial support and found
an effective advocate in the person of William Pincus, a Vice-President of the Ford
Foundation who was responsible for the Foundation’s anti-poverty initiatives.”).
429. See Ralph S. Tyler & Robert S. Catz, The Contradictions of Clinical Legal
Education, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 693, 695 (1980) (“Not until the mid-1960’s, in
response then to societal pressures, student demand, and educational
commitment, was the innovation of Langdell’s case method extended from the
study of decided cases 2 to student work on actual and undecided cases.”).
430. See Yearly Reports of Secretary Office of Committee of Chinese Clinical
Legal Education, http://www.cliniclaw.cn. (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). A Chinese/U.S. Program in Experiential
Legal Teaching has been contributing much to the development and promotion of
clinical legal education in China. This program is initiated and led by Brian
Landsberg, Distinguished Professor and Scholar of Pacific McGeorge School of
Law. See Brian Landsberg, Walking on Two Legs in Chinese Law Schools: A
Chinese/U.S. Program in Experiential Legal Education, 16 INT’L J. CLINICAL
LEGAL EDUC. 38 (2011); see also Liu Xiaobing, Recent Reform on the Legal Ethics
Test in Chinese Legal Profession Admission System and the Challenges It Faces
(forthcoming).
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In two remarkable ways, the Die-Hard lawyer and the U.S.
civil rights lawyer are cut from the same cloth. First, both groups
have been persecuted for challenging deeply-entrenched social
order and power structures. And second, both groups have offended
traditional professional norms of behavior, engendering the
approbation from professional and state officials.
The current mood of the possibility of legal change by cause
lawyer is grim. Although there has surely been an increase in the
number of human rights-oriented lawyers in China since 2012, and
even since the 709 Crackdown, there is evidence that the
ramped-up suppression and harassment by the state is wearing
down the resolve of long-time activist lawyers. On a recent
proposal to limit the number of times a non-Beijing licensed car
may enter Beijing,431 a lawyer commented on his social media that,
“if this policy came out 9 years ago, I might organize meetings,
write ‘public interest petitions,’ and call for constitutionality and
legality review; 6 years ago, I might write articles, receive
interviews, and propose suggestions; 3 years ago, I might grumble
a little; now, I only want to watch them silently.”432
Despite these striking similarities, the two groups exist in
powerfully different legal environments. By law, the Chinese
lawyer’s number one professional duty is to the state, while the US
lawyer’s independence from state influence is legendary.433
Further, for the US civil rights lawyer, the highest authority, often
belatedly, supported the lawyer’s reform work.434 The federal
431. See Owen Guo, Want to Drive in Beijing? Good Luck in the License Plate
Lottery, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/29/world/
asia/china-beijing-traffic-pollution.html (detailing the difficulty of Chinese
drivers with out-of-town license plates in getting a Beijing license plate through
the city’s lottery system) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
432. Confidential post to listserv on file with author.
433. See Leland Benton, From Socialist Ethics to Legal Ethics: Legal Ethics,
Professional Conduct, and the Chinese Legal Profession, 28(a) PAC. BASIN L.J. 210,
212 (2011) (“The Constitution, whose emanations permeate the legal system and
which all lawyers are bound to uphold, lays heavy emphasis on the obligations of
individual citizens to the state and the Party.”).
434. See Belknap, supra note 400 (describing federal government’s role in
advancing civil rights during the Kennedy administration).
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courts and to some extent the executive branch stepped in at
crucial junctures to thwart the repressive state and local regimes.
There will be no such support from higher authority in China.
In the end, the spirit of reform and justice-seeking connects
the US civil rights lawyer with the Chinese Die-Hard lawyer. But
the surrounding legal structures make the mission of the of the
Die-Hard lawyer far more daunting than that of his US
counterpart.435 The challenges faced by US civil rights lawyers
were stiff. And without question, the US civil rights struggle
persists today and many injustices remain. Indeed, during the
presidency of Donald Trump, civil rights are under renewed and
vigorous attacks.436 Lawyers, in the spirit of their 1940s–70s
forerunners, have fought back and played significant roles in
resisting these renewed attacks. Importantly, because of the work
of their forerunners, US lawyers today can use the aggressive
methods and represent causes with little or no professional or legal
consequences. As difficult and at times seemingly hopeless was the
US civil rights lawyer’s mission, and as much as that mission
continues some seventy years after it began in earnest, the mission
of the Chinese Die-Hard lawyer is infinitely more difficult.437

435. See id. (“The Chinese legal system is often characterized by the strong
influence of the Communist Party and informality in both the law and legal
process.”).
436. See Trump Administration Civil and Human Rights Rollbacks,
LEADERSHIP CONF. ON CIV. AND HUM. RTS., https://civilrights.org/trump-rollbacks/
(last visited September 18, 2018) (listing civil and human right rollbacks by the
Trump Administration) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
437. Although this article is a joint effort of the two authors, Prof. Lan does
not agree with the characterization of those Chinese rights lawyers as “die-hard”
lawyers, nor does he contribute to drafting the related part.

